

Governing Safer Cities in a Globalised World

A Guide for Policy Makers

Draft for Discussion

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With two-thirds of the current world population expected to reside in urban environments by 2030, SDG 11 and its promotion of safe, inclusive and resilient cities represents a key goal of the 2030 sustainable development agenda. The current draft, 'Safe Cities in a Globalised World: A Guide for Policy Makers,' is the primary output of a project funded by the UN Development Account, and managed by UNODC. The draft Guide, developed by the Centre of Criminology at the University of Cape Town, highlights the importance of the complex interplays between local contexts and global forces – such as between local development, city governance, and wider drivers of crime and insecurity, including the trafficking of illegal drugs and other forms of smuggling, corruption, and terrorism. The ultimate goal is to contribute towards meeting these challenges at a local level within an integrated developmental framework in order to inform policy makers at all levels of government. The guide thus aims to assist the UN community in addressing the issues related to city safety, as pertaining to the UN Development Assistance Frameworks and in the context of the 'Delivering as One' approach.

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INTRODUCTION: THE AGE OF THE CITY

Urban insecurity: phenomena of a globally interconnected world

Cities have become critical nodes in a new age of global governance. They are not only hubs of economic productivity, but are the intersection of cross-border flows, including of people, goods and even ideas. More than 54% of the world's population currently lives in an urban environment, and urban populations are predicted to grow by a rate of 1.5–2% per year. An emerging phenomena is that of the mega-city: vast metropolises of more than 10 million people. There are 28 mega-cities today, whereas in 1950 there was just one (UN 2014: 2).

Unlike in the past, however, the new engine of urbanisation is the global south. According to the United Nations, globally, an additional 2.5 billion people will move to urban areas by 2050, with nearly 90% of the increase concentrated in Asia and Africa (UN 2014). Accordingly, the debate on city management has often been about development, generally defined in the narrow sense of economic growth and access to social services, and it was assumed that with development would come prosperity, and with prosperity, greater safety. But it is increasingly clear that this relationship is neither linear nor causal and that the social exclusion and inequality that may arise from development may be key contributors to insecurity.

This is an era characterised by unprecedented mobility and connectivity, with both positive and negative implications. Whereas global trade has expanded significantly, so too has illicit trade and the organised criminal networks that perpetuate them, and wealth is captured by elites who span business, politics and criminal industries. While people are better informed and engaged global citizens, they are also increasingly aware of inequalities and injustice, and able to challenge existing governance frameworks through protest, violence, insurgency and terrorism.

Many cities now face a reality in which they are developing incredibly fast, and yet also becoming increasingly dangerous. People living together in close proximity and in conditions of poverty, marginalisation and poor governance are more likely to be affected by crime and insecurity. As a result, insecurity and violence threaten enormous numbers of people across the world's mega-cities, with those who bear the brunt of violence often the poorest and most marginalised.

Responding to this complex package is often placed at the feet of city governments, community leaders, urban planners and national and regional policy makers, who find themselves challenged to understand and respond to the impact of global forces and flows on local conditions. That then is the purpose of this guide.

Dealing with corruption, organised crime, terrorism, conflict and violence are often viewed as a responsibility of the police and the wider security forces. Yet the evidence suggests that a purely law-enforcement approach will not solve the problem, and in fact might make it worse. The challenges we face have wider antecedents and require increasingly complicated and sophisticated management responses that draw on the

skills of all levels of government, including by aiming at preventing crime, violence and victimisation from occurring.

The purpose of the discussions that follow is to enrich the wealth of material that focuses on enhancing citizen safety within the urban environment with a dedicated focus on understanding the multiple risk factors of crime and violence, including those related to transnational threats and global illicit flows, and how city governments can promote effective and evidence-based crime-prevention policies and programmes.

The guide draws on the conclusions of a series of representative city case studies from ten cities across the global south, and their experiences and lessons learned in dealing with crime, corruption and terrorism, with a focus on how wider global interconnections and flows may have local consequences, and vice versa. The target audience is policy makers and practitioners, and those concerned citizens who seek to influence governments and other actors to bring positive and lasting change.

Putting city security on the global agenda

The newly endorsed UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development includes Goal 11: *to make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable*. This comes in clear recognition of the global consensus that successful urbanisation is a foundation for global development, and how it is experienced by the majority of the world's citizens (UN 2015a).

What is less obviously perceptible, but is a significant step forward from the development framework of the previous generation, is the mainstreaming of safety objectives as an underpinning of development progress. For example, of the 169 targets that underpin the Sustainable Development Agenda, more than 12% (23 targets in total) relate to mitigating organised crime (Global Initiative 2015). This was an issue that was once explicitly excluded from the lexicon and mandate of development actors, but now is understood as an increasingly central concern, to be addressed as a development challenge and requiring a development response.

The *World Development Report 2011* first clearly identified in a seminal and widely read policy document that the nature of safety, insecurity and conflict had evolved, no longer fitting the mould of the past. It argued that repeated cycles of violence, connected to weak governance, instability and different forms and levels of crime, are constraining development and economic growth for citizens – not only in fragile and conflict-affected states, but increasingly across states and urban hubs regardless of income level. This, the report concluded, created a system by which local violence is shaped by an extremely complex array of factors, often in a highly politicised environment; this in turn negatively undermines the quality of institutions and governance, and the provision of economic and social development. The net result is that countries experiencing high levels of protracted violence see a causal reduction in development performance – estimated at 20% – and decades worth of economic growth (World Bank 2011: xii).

The 2015 OECD *States of Fragility* report recognised the urgency of moving towards a more multi-dimensional understanding of what is needed to achieve sustainable development. By changing the framework, several middle-income countries with disproportionately high levels of crime-related violence, sub-national conflict or poor access to justice came sharply into focus as being 'fragile'. Importantly, this report argued that fragility could be found in both the developed and developing world, and was a product of the intersection between local and global factors.

Placing cities at the centre

Important international policy processes that identify city safety as a defining issue are now under way. UN-Habitat is charged with producing a set of Safer Cities Guidelines. These are a powerful recognition of the complexity of bringing safety and the requirement for multiple actors to be engaged. In 2013, in its resolution 68/188, entitled *The rule of law, crime prevention and criminal justice in the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015* the General Assembly requested the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to provide substantive contributions to UN-Habitat with regard to efforts to complement the development of the Safer City Guidelines.

The explicit linkage between these development objectives and safety is unprecedented in terms of the objectives of the United Nations and the international community, and provides a mandate to make such concerns central to debates in the global south, where the impact of these global flows with local insecurity are most keenly felt. But as a recent discussion document produced by a leading development practitioner at the OECD noted: 'It is arguably the transnational level that remains most alien to development actors ... most frameworks were not geared towards a regional or global dimension' (Whaites 2015: 9).

Considering the interconnectedness of people and places, a process exponentially made more rapid by new technology, the very concepts of development and safety have become harder to understand and measure. In the past, development was symbolised and measured by socio-economic markers – GDP, Gini-coefficient, employment rate and others. Yet, as has been increasingly acknowledged, these markers no longer seem to reflect the realities or pathways by which contemporary cities have grown. The contradictions between globalisation and city insecurity are well illustrated in the following cases:

- Despite major economic reforms that have strengthened Mexico's economic performance, many of the country's cities exhibit dramatic levels of violence and penetration by organised crime into the state. This has resulted in high levels of displacement and public expression of dissatisfaction with the government.
- Karachi has the highest levels of terrorism in the world, responsible for one in two of global incidents. The city has a permanently deployed paramilitary force to attempt to increase security, yet is considered the engine of Pakistan's economic growth and generates half of the country's tax revenue.

- Cape Town is regarded as one of the top tourist destinations in the world, yet has a homicide rate of 65 per 100,000, putting it in parallel with cartel-controlled parts of Latin America.

Survey evidence consistently shows that levels of crime and violence are of considerable concern amongst residents in these and many other cities. For ordinary people safety is a key quality-of-life issue – and one that they feel governments at all levels are failing to deliver. With the state failing to provide the underpinnings of development – a secure environment in which to make life choices – citizens are finding means by which to achieve their own safety, resulting in the investment into alternative providers of governance and security – which are often private, violent actors.

Preventing cities that fail

As global inequality has increasingly grown – not only do 70% of people live in an environment where income inequality is increasing, but a recent report has highlighted that a mere 62 individuals hold as much wealth as the bottom half of the global population (Oxfam 2014); perceptions that governments are corrupt and self-serving, or that elites are capturing disproportionate shares of national wealth and influence have further increased the distance between citizen and the state. Instead, people are using communication technology to find alternative groups with which to affiliate, which may not be those with which they are co-located. As a consequence, their sense of collective ownership in their urban environment and their sense of civic responsibility is eroded, contributing to a further degradation of the city as a meaningful source of value.

Such a process of erosion may contribute to people feeling alienated from state institutions, including those at the level of the city. A globalised world offers opportunities for shared interest groups that are globally dispersed to be brought together through a common social platform. This can bring benefits – diasporas have been an important source of resilience, for example – but also challenges.

As indicated in the diagram below, negative forces of globalisation, weak or distorted forms of local governance and a set of pro-violence conditions in society have created situations of extreme human insecurity. These are interrelated; however, most research and policy work concentrates not on the *intersections*, but on each of the factors in isolation. While each is important in its own right, the reality of the emerging safety challenge is to understand more effectively how these dynamics act on each other – and what conditions will maximise safety and development opportunities for citizens.



Figure 1: The interdependent dynamics of safety

Cities that fail will mean a global community that fails. Cities that are unsafe will condemn millions to reduced livelihoods and constrain the life chances of many. If cities are to bring promise to the majority of the world’s citizens we must extend our focus to understanding and responding to their complex safety challenges, not least of which are those engendered by the role of cities as clearing houses in the global economy.

This raises important questions of how to respond, and whose voices need to drive this conversation. But the normative framework, the nomenclature and the body of research and analysis around issues of safety and citizens’ expectations are too often driven by research institutions and policy makers in the north. Yet, differentials between levels of violence in the global north and the global south can be stark; the average homicide rate for Europe is 3 per 100,000 in contrast to several Central America cities, for example, which have rates over 100 per 100,000 people. One incidence of terrorism in a European city is cataclysmic. In a city like Karachi it is more than a daily occurrence.

At the same time, however, as the 2015 OECD report noted, a growing number of cities in the north are suffering similar safety challenges as those in the south, with zones of fragility and insecurity where often the most marginalised people in the city live. This points to the fact that traditional approaches are no longer working, and increasingly these debates around security need to be framed by the developing south, whose peoples, identities and cultures are now the driving force of urbanisation and where levels of individual safety must be improved.

What does ‘safety’ mean?
 Safety can be thought of as physical protection, but it can also be used in the wider sense, speaking to the ability of people to make the choices they consider necessary for their own lives. That implies that safety is at heart a necessary condition for providing life choices to individual people. Life chances are dramatically reduced in contexts of violence, fear and uncertainty, but equally when social services such as education and

health are poor, missing or difficult to access. Indeed, lower levels of physical safety are almost always present when wider forms of opportunity and service delivery are missing. That is no coincidence. Safety then encompasses much more than simply protecting people – it means the development of educational structures, recreational venues, the harnessing of local skills, and the facilitation of community-building activities. When viewed from this perspective, safety has everything to do with inclusive development, and thus the two need to be strategically integrated in the deployment of resources and interventions.

While we refer to ‘insecurity’ to denote conditions where there is crime, violence, corruption, fear and uncertainty, we have avoided using the term ‘security’ as a response, given its often narrower interpretation in some contexts. Our aim, as later sections of the guide will demonstrate, is to suggest that city and other levels of government must strive towards a system of ‘safety governance’.

Using this guide

The challenge for many cities is how to respond to the complex interaction between the local and the global. The central contention of this guide is twofold. First, forms of insecurity in the globe’s urban complexes are changing, increasingly interlinked with local insecurities driving global patterns of insecurity, and vice versa; the result is what we term new forms of ‘criminal governance’ which are unlikely to be reversed by a limited set of crime-prevention projects, but require a wider focus on what we term ‘safety governance’. Second, given this, cities can only effectively understand many forms of local insecurity when they view these through a wider lens of how such insecurities intersect with broader global patterns and flows; and, that while cities often feel that their capacity to respond is limited, they do in fact have a key role to play, most notably by increasing the resilience of local communities and driving forward wider processes of safety governance, not least by ensuring better cooperation with other levels and functions of government.

While recognising that every city will have a unique context, this guide endeavours to provide tools by which the intersection of global flows and local forces can be understood, and responses can be crafted.

We have populated this guide with case studies drawn from ten geo-politically diverse, democratic cities, attempting to share a broad cross-section of experiences from different continents of the developing world. The guide draws on work in the following cities: Cape Town (South Africa); Lagos (Nigeria); Nairobi (Kenya); Karachi (Pakistan); Istanbul (Turkey); Medellín (Colombia); Mexico City (Mexico); São Paulo (Brazil); Kingston (Jamaica) and Manila (Philippines).

Research work in each of the cities has informed the types of challenges that are consistently faced in these contexts, and the questions with which policy makers have to grapple in their day-to-day work. As such, the guide is structured around these questions, as the starting point for any review of safety through the lens of global–local connectivity.

These are:

Part I: Understanding the interdependencies

How do different global flows intersect *with each other* and the localities that they shape? Asked differently, do global flows converge or diverge depending on local conditions? And by implication, are some global flows more important than others in shaping the nature of local security and impacting on development?

Part II: Creating shared priorities

How should the relationships between global flows and local security be analysed in individual cities, in order to build a shared understanding of priority concerns? Is there a standard set of tools that can be applied in cities with very different histories and current realities?

Part III: Safety governance

Based on the answers to the two sets of questions above, if global connections are driving insecurity at local level and local conditions contribute to wider forms of criminality, how can policy makers respond? What are the available options? How can these be conceptually and strategically framed?

PART I: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERDEPENDENCIES

The 'fragile city'

Cities in a globalised world are faced by a series of interconnected challenges. On the one hand, the trends of rapid urbanisation mean that they are subject to enormous economic and social disruption at home. On the other, they are buffeted by external political and economic forces, including illicit flows and challenging, violent ideologies. This is taking place at the same time as individual city residents are more connected than ever, both with each other, with family and friends in rural areas, and with people all over the world, including in other major urban complexes. Achieving safety in the city will require understanding and managing these forces and the interactions between them.

In short, the challenge for safety policy makers is to understand how cities are embedded in a wider set of regional and global flows – and how these flows may impact upon local conditions, creating insecurity. This is a challenge both for the developed and the developing world, as the need for global policy makers to understand how local and global forces interact becomes increasingly crucial. It is then itself an enormously difficult task, but one that is made more challenging where resource and tax bases are smaller, and state institutions are weaker, with lower levels of legitimacy with citizens. There are many variables involved, and not all of them appear to have immediate or direct links to safety. That is a feature of the complexity of contemporary urban development and its global interconnections.

The purpose of Part I of the guide is to explore how these forces intersect and how insecurity is manifested. Central to this is to understand and recognise the long-held assumptions regarding a causal relationship between economic growth, development and greater safety and security. In fact, the case studies brought together to inform this guide suggest that unless a concerted effort is made by the state to ensure equitable access to resources and inclusive economic growth, the relationship between safety and economic growth is inverse: many residents in cities across the world have borne witness to the results of capital inflow and international trade, and yet continue to lead lives in the shadows of the new skyscrapers, mired in pockets of violence and insecurity, as an urban underclass.

Cities need to find innovative ways to govern their own safety in an age of interconnectivity. Modern cities now serve as the primary nodes in the fundamental systems that structure the contemporary global political-economy – ranging from, amongst others, financial systems, government platforms and transportation routes. If the city is not functioning, then this impacts on the entire country, and often the wider region. Some analysts have gone so far to describe some of the modern mega-cities in the developing world as 'feral cities' (Norton 2003); another prominent study has suggested that the forces shaping cities will make them akin to warfare of a new age (Kilcullen 2013).

Our analysis is less bleak, though the challenge should not be underplayed. As Muggah (2012: 1) argues, an increasing number of urban metropolises can be described as 'fragile cities': 'Discrete metropolitan unit[s] whose governance arrangements exhibit a declining ability and/or willingness to deliver on the social contract'.

As this quotation illustrates, governance, or indeed the lack thereof, underpins much of the root causes of fragile cities. Modern cities have become extremely unequal, stratified along economic, social and political lines, all of which serve to create dangerous urban landscapes in which mistrust, anger, and, ironically, feelings of isolation pervade. The harbingers of transnational illicit organisations and operations, used to facilitate various illicit/illegal flows and transactions, thrive upon these populations excluded, or voluntarily isolating themselves from mainstream society, creating vicious cycles of deviant, destructive behaviour.

Governance too, therefore, will have to be the thrust of the solution, but to rely on the status quo delivered in a piecemeal fashion by weak state institutions is not the answer. Urban governance needs to be reframed and reconceptualised, on the one hand to repel or guard against pernicious negative forces and flows, but at the same time to rebuild a meaningful social contract between the growing number of modern, urban metropolises.

The intention of Part I is not to suggest that all fragile cities are equal, or that the causes and drivers of insecurity are the same or similar in nature. Instead, it is to highlight some of the common threads that are woven through the experiences of many urban environments in the global south, as they relate to safety, security and transnational threats. Policy makers reading this chapter may find that some of the analysis and interspersed case-study examples resonate with their own experiences and challenges; in other cases it may not apply. The goal of Part I is mainly to present an introduction to some of the key forces at work, and the trajectory of negative development that they represent.

Violence and protection

The extent of violence and the fragmentation of the provision of security is one of the greatest challenges that we face in unsafe cities, and it is usually the first one to attract the attention of policy makers. Violence is a clear warning flare that all is not well: it is disconcerting to the middle-class electorate to which governments often respond; it undermines investment, erodes development progress for the majority and creates widespread insecurity. As the various experimentations with gang truces in violent cities have exemplified, the objective of these responses is to prevent homicides and lower violence, not to stop underlying criminal behaviour. Similarly, violent extremism mobilises international attention and prompt reactions, whereas growing religious fundamentalism may be allowed to continue unchecked, regardless of the implications for human rights or civil liberties.

Increasing violence manifests in multiple ways, and fragile cities are often characterised by a growing proliferation of non-statutory security forces, such as liberation armies,

guerrilla armies, private security companies and political party militias, all of which undermine the state's monopoly of force. Their genesis, however, in many of the cities studied, did not come out of an intention to challenge the state, but emerged as security entities in response to real or perceived threats. Routinely, these groups developed out of the 'margins', in and from populations neglected by the state's governance and protection, or, in some cases, as a result of direct persecution by the state itself.

Thus, the initial motivation of the organising was for these groups to provide some semblance of 'safety' for members, and, sometimes, for a constituency. With strength in numbers, these groups are able to push back against the forces that threaten them – whether police, rival groups or larger social forces. It is only once these groups have established some kind of control or order in a given territory or constituency that they must find a means to sustain and commodify it. Thus the requirement to provide genuine security morphs over time into security from self-imposed threats. As the UNODC described in relation to drug-trafficking groups in Latin America, socially excluded people often lack access to security, as well as other amenities provided to better-established residents. In this context 'neighbourhood watches', which may have started as a mechanism for providing security to new immigrants and other vulnerable people, over time morph into informal private security operations that impose a tax on local residents, and ultimately become a protection racket. (UNODC 2012a)

São Paulo: governing through organised crime

In São Paulo people join organised-crime groups for their protective functions. These groups, most notably the one that dominates the city, the PCC, have become impossible to separate from their roots in places that are historically violent and subject to violence, especially prisons and the city's slums. A path-breaking study has shown that violence in the city is regulated in a complicated consensus between the police and the PCC. Reductions in violence are a direct result of forms of governance exerted by organised crime. Spurts of violence result when the consensus between police and criminal groups breaks down (see Willis 2015).

Within a protection racket, violence and the threat of violence remains a very important commodity ensuring the group's capacity to control and exact rents. Criminal groups use violence to ensure the loyalty of their subordinates, firstly through violence or the threat of violence, and secondly by creating and emphasising a sense of identity and belonging, and communicating this widely (see Gambetta 1993). The level of violence required rises and falls depending on the environment: violence might increase in response to violent or securitised responses by the state; it may also rise due to competition from other armed and violent groups. Violence may fall when one group's dominance has been established, or because an accommodation has been reached with competitors and/or the state (Shaw forthcoming).

The use of violence is also integral to the ethos of terrorist groups, whose often unequal warfare against the state, its citizenship or the prevailing ideology is realised through violent acts against state and civilian targets. Terrorist acts, however, garner

diminishing returns over time, and in some of the cities where terrorism against citizens is a daily occurrence, these groups are struggling to prove their worth (Shelley 2014; Hussain 2015). Financing is critical to be able to scale up their attacks and achieve their objectives, thereby increasing the alignment of terrorist groups with sources of financing, as well as the need to find other means by which to garner continued support for their cause: two issues that will be further explored in the subsequent sections.

Inequality and illicit livelihoods

The challenge now is that many cities act as fulcrums around which illegitimate systems of violence, criminal activity and structural problems revolve. In contrast to predictions of sustained economic development, bringing with it prosperity for the inhabitants of cities, in many instances socio-economic development has been haphazard and inconsistent, and these disparities have contributed to the emergence of 'shadow' markets and economies. Driven by the same needs and desires that underpin the formal economy, shadow markets have emerged in *response* to unequal developmental narratives, in which many residents find few ways to earn a genuine living in the formal economy.

While normatively problematic, the *reasons* people may then turn to illicit or illegal activities become informed in response to the very strategies intended, at least on paper, to help make their lives better. In attempting to understand these unintended effects, and in trying to redirect policy and governmental practices so that their effects are beneficial, an understanding of the systems in which individuals live and on which they draw in defining their lives and meeting their basic needs is required.

In many cases poverty and unemployment do not just provide a greater supply of potential illegal labour for organised criminal activities, but also create a favourable environment for criminals to exploit the social fabric of countries as a foundation for organised crime. Limited authority in the economic and security sectors are often linked, as illicit flows are used to finance parastatal security forces and fuel violence. For example, the rise of organised crime in Africa became perceptible at a time of extensive political and economic change (Ellis and Shaw 2015), where accessing resources was a means to build political settlements and gain influence. Foreign actors with the capacity to bring resources, or to bring domestic commodities to international markets, became potent interfaces between global illicit flows and local socio-economic and political manoeuvrings (Varese 2011).

Fulcrum Manila

In Manila it is the production, distribution and use of illegal drugs that has undermined the continued development of the city, by becoming the focal point of illicit activities and markets. Methamphetamine (or *shabu*) has emerged as the dominant illegal drug, as has been widely recognised by policing officials, researchers and international organisations. Approximately 86% of all drug use and/or related arrests involve *shabu*. Metro Manila is also the main smuggling, trans-shipment, and destination point of drugs

in the country. The illegal drug economy, through both use and trade, has infiltrated government practices both in the city and nationally, with about 20% of low-level government officials either having been found guilty of or having drug-related criminal cases pending against them. In Manila itself, this figure stands at a remarkable 92%.

With such a large and lucrative market, one that is by virtue of use alone already part and parcel of government, the city has become an attractive destination for transnational drug distributors and cartels – the Sinaloa/Mexican cartel has now become very active in the city, country, and indeed entire region, bringing with it violent practices and tempting short-term pathways for individual enrichment. Through partnerships and competition, these international cartels have also increased the levels of corruption and terrorism experienced by citizens. According to a high-level Philippine National Police official, the Sinaloa cartel is currently cooperating with three major Triad groups. The officials also mentioned an increased presence of the Italian Mafia, Yakuza, and Nigerian transnational crime organisations within Metro Manila. As more groups and drugs move into the area the chance of a drug war with increased violence and associated crimes escalates (see Guth 2015).

Organised criminal activity across the world is worth some US\$870 billion a year (UNODC 2012b). Realigning and making relevant developmental strategies requires that growth is not only recorded numerically, but felt in a very real sense by those who live and work in the world's cities, particularly given some of the demographic pressures. Youth bulges and other structural conditions are resulting in a growing proportion of people in many of the urban cities who should be active and productive members of the labour force, but are, instead, 'NINIs' (not in school and not employed) – unskilled, and with limited legal economic opportunities. It is often criminal enterprises that offer not only the lowest barriers to entry for employment, but also the highest returns. It is hard to find alternatives within the legitimate economies that offer equivalent levels of remuneration or social status.

Having access to goods and services, however, that make living easier are of no use if fears of violence continue to dominate peoples' lives, if corrupt political and economic systems continue to waste limited public funds (the economic impact of which is often felt the most by those the earn the least), and if the threat of sporadic episodes of urban terror make the future uncertain. In short, while socio-economic development programmes may be designed to increase the well-being of people, they may instead create the very structural environments in which individuals find themselves economically excluded, politically disenfranchised and socially alienated from the societies in which they live.

Alternative governance: competition and cooperation

While illicit or illegal activities may be illegitimate in the eyes of governing organisations, local communities and individuals may view them in entirely different ways. When security, economic opportunity, political transition and state reforms do not reach all regions or sectors the space left by the state becomes a fertile territory for

illicit networks to offer apparent alternative solutions to local populations (Briscoe et al. 2014), and in doing so they generate legitimacy and loyalty from those populations.

By defining organised crime and the violence that they perpetrate as merely being in response to market forces – ‘entrepreneurial’ entities – is to underplay the role that these groups often play in providing security and filling a market void. This assumption about organised crime has defined many of the responses to it. Anti-organised-crime policies often hold that disrupting economic lifelines will undermine its strength and lead to its dissolution. Drug interdiction programmes, seizures of goods, killing of leaders and the mass imprisonment of related offenders are a logical extension of this view, which supposes that such organisations will cease to exist if their connection to the market – products, brain trust or manpower – is severed. In fact, however, where criminal groups are providing a service to the local population, their position is much more complex and powerful.

We have already discussed the cases in which crime and terror groups provide security in the absence of the state, but across the globe there are many examples of organised crime and terror groups delivering other kinds of services, including social services, livelihoods and some forms of social organisation and justice. In doing so they gain local legitimacy distinct from their economic activities.

Nairobi: conflict and collusion

The cities we studied have all undergone dramatic changes within short spaces of time – they are truly cities ‘in flux’. Take the case of Nairobi, where political, economic and criminal factors have intersected to produce serious violence. At the same time, the city and its economy have continued to grow.

Over the recent years, Nairobi has emerged as transit hub for drug traffickers, who are finding a local market in the country. Further, there is suspicion that senior politicians, civil servants and wealthy businessmen who might be involved in drug trafficking also take part in poaching, money laundering and other transnational crimes whose proceeds ultimately fuel and fund terrorism. In 2008 an estimated 1,500 people died and 650,000 people were displaced due to post-election violence, mostly committed by gangs. Nairobi’s poorest areas were carved into enclaves where vigilante groups and criminal organisations associated with different ethnic groups patrolled ‘their’ areas, demanding to see identity cards, carrying out evictions and attacking the homes and retail premises of members of opposing ethnic groups.

Provision of security services by Nairobi local government is uneven, with most of the informal settlements left out of the planning and budgeting process. However, even those in the affluent areas do not always rely on formal police or the local government for provision of security, water or garbage collection among other things, since the services are either substandard and their availability is not predictable (see Mutahi 2015).

Organised-crime groups are frequently portrayed as infiltrating the state, but a closer analysis demonstrates that firstly it tends to be the state – through its absence and failures – that opens the space for other groups to gain traction. In some cases, this has been because the state cannot or will not; in some cases, it is done with the tacit permission of the state; in others, it is done in partnership with actors of the state or its institutions, where both sides gain from the association, and state actors engage in ‘profitable permissiveness’ – a coexistence that is purely tacit and based on toleration and a degree of distance between the parties (Briscoe and Kalkman 2016). In some cities in Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America, criminal–political relationships have advanced to unprecedented levels of complexity and sophistication.

By contrast, terrorist groups gain from their capacity to distance and distinguish themselves from the state, which is in part why strategies that conflate organised crime and terror lack nuance. However, they too may profit from governance vacuums, or from predatory governance or corrupt states, and the power of these groups is based upon an ability to manipulate local grievances to their benefit as well as to employ the threat of violent force. In their strategies for resourcing their acts, however, they follow very similar models to crime groups, establishing protection taxes on the communities within their control.

In all cases, rebuilding linkages between citizens and the state is the only means by which the alternative governance framework can be redressed. The central message of the 2011 *World Development Report* is that ‘strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide ... security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence’ (World Bank 2011: 2). While this message is preceded by the acknowledgement that ‘confronting this challenge effectively means that institutions need to change’ (ibid.: xii), it is still these institutions that are seen as the fundamental drivers and facilitators of any strategies. However, while possessing the structures and institutions, the *World Development Report* emphasises that these countries and cities often do not possess the power and influence (or, to put it differently, ‘the reach’) needed to effect substantive change. Not only are these societies far less rigorously structured, far more dynamic and fluid, and often still under contestation, but they are often still highly interdependent with neighbouring countries, affected by regional conflict systems, or subject to transnational forces.

At the local level, all of this suggests that simply putting visible signs of ‘government’ or straightforward provision of services into communities that are under the control of organised-crime and terrorist groups will not be effective in addressing governance deficits, unless the issue of legitimacy is considered. Instead, a new framework of responses is required that will explicitly address the alternative or competing governance structures that these groups represent (Reitano and Hunter 2016).

There is a need to shift away from either accommodating criminal interests wherever they manifest or trying to outgun them with militarised, security-first approaches. Rather, the challenge for urban institutions will be to find ways to realistically engage in supporting communities and citizens both nationally and locally to build viable and trustworthy propositions of governance and to provide the necessary oversight and

transparency that will prevent these being subverted by illicit interests (Whaites 2015). The way that the international community supports service delivery, development and governance, and engages in efforts to counter organised crime, will need to be rethought, with focus on genuine governance and a better understanding of how legitimacy is earned and retained.

Convergence and divergence

The rhetoric of international policy increasingly emphasises the convergence of certain trends, both licit and illicit. In economics, globalisation is seen as a force that has brought the world together, broken down borders and facilitated a much freer exchange of goods and ideas. In development sectors, the emphasis is on cultural linkages, global norms, the movement of people and ideologies. On the negative side, however, the growing links between organised crime and terror groups is often highlighted, as one example of detrimental convergence. The interconnections and overlaps between politics, business and criminal networks is another. These channels, these forces, both negative and positive, stretch out through the countries in which they are situated, but often reach far beyond political and social boundaries, whereby large cities connect with each other in a myriad of ways.

This is particularly well illustrated by evidence that social media connections span the divide between individual cities. Major urban areas connect both with the areas around them and with each other. This is graphically illustrated in the world map below, which is, in the words of the author of the figure, 'a visualization that would show which cities had a lot of friendships between them' (see Butler 2010). In this demonstration, the continents' familiar outlines are the result of the connections between people and not, as traditionally posited, the inverse. As the picture suggests, cities and wider clusters of urban development are at the heart of this connectivity.



The result is a graphical illustration of the importance of cities, their interconnectedness, the density of the relationships they both create and sustain, and their importance to the modern world. The picture is symbolic of a shift in both thinking and practice – it is the relationships between people that define the context in which they live, rather than being limited simply to geographic locality or political institution. What the picture shows, moreover, is that while the map of the world traditionally features immovable boundaries, defined historically and represented politically, it is now the connections between people that define those self-same borders.

The assumption is often that only the wealthy are in communication. Indeed, wealthy inhabitants of many cities in the world are far more likely to connect with each other than with the poor in their own cities. This mobile global elite is highly connected. We should not make the assumption, however, that the poor and marginalised are not also connected across borders. Global flows of migrants, growing diaspora populations and the growth in electronic and financial flows are also a feature of transfers between the poor, and cities are the fulcrums of this interconnectivity. Such networks, however, can and have been used to facilitate criminal activity, violence and terrorism. This is but one means of understanding these networks, however, for they can and often do play very important and positive roles in both enabling the development and ensuring the safety of vulnerable and/or recently established communities. Moreover, such relationships are malleable – with the right tools and filters, such networks can themselves become drivers for positive change, as we explore in Part III.

Khayelitsha: excluded and connected

Khayelitsha, the huge informal settlement on the outskirts of Cape Town, is both connected to the city and divided from it. It is connected to rural areas from which its residents are drawn as well as wider illicit flows, most notably of drugs. Such differences are reflected in terms of security as well, with policing in Khayelitsha having been seen as so ineffective by residents that an official inquiry had to be launched. Far from being disconnected from illicit flows, Khayelitsha is increasingly closely integrated into them. Even though very close geographically, the organised criminal networks concerned with the production and distribution of illegal drugs have also responded to its specific conditions: a recent pricing study found significant variances in the prices charged by illegal drug distributors, with the products invariably being much cheaper in Khayelitsha. Distributors employ numerous marketing strategies, both to encourage loyalty and to increase sales. Users' primary sources of income include collecting cardboard or glass for recycling, the offering of unskilled services, begging, petty crime, transactional sex, sex work and selling illegal substances. The illicit drug economy is dynamic, profit-driven, and yet also regulated by market forces – it displays numerous similarities with the regulatory mechanisms that shape the formal economy and directly shapes local forms of governance and power (see Howell et al. 2015).

The net result is the emergence and sustainment of economies beyond the ambit of legal regulation. These economies may not necessarily be criminal in nature, but, without legitimate forms of protection and oversight, often rely on violence as a means of

ensuring compliance. The need to enforce business transactions and deals, in turn, creates the need for organisations that are able and willing to enforce the terms of economic interaction, giving birth to organised criminal organisations and resourcing terror groups. With unregulated competition and attractive profit margins, competing organisations may thus begin to undermine the security of the communities in which they operate. These cycles of violence have been well noted before, and should be imagined as negative feedback loops which serve to both continue and make dangerous economic activity beyond the legitimate market.

Convergence should however not be overstated, and while this chapter has attempted to explain the interconnections between the groups that perpetuate urban insecurity and jeopardise safety, the conclusion should not be drawn that all of these groups and networks are the same.

While concerns with criminal activity, terrorism and corruption are often driven by sensationalist reports in the public media, it is critical that a distinction is maintained between the moral aspects of these phenomena and their actual working dynamics. All too often, interventions and reforms are constructed as moral causes that in the process lose sight of their actual purpose. The consequences of organised criminal activity are of course problematic, but in order to begin dealing with them in the most effective and efficient manner, they also need to be understood in and of themselves. There are, for instance, often very good reasons why people become directed to these activities, and it is only when these reasons are understood and placed in context that better measures of control can be distilled. Of course, this does not *justify* these acts, but it does illuminate the core drivers of violence, which will need to be engaged with to enable effective alternative avenues to become meaningful alternatives. This raises the crucial issue of the linkages between violence, organised crime, corruption and terrorism.

Corruption does not only have the effect of undermining the strength and/or operational effectiveness of local government agencies, but may actually serve as the means by which they are transformed into facilitators of other forms of criminal activity. In such cases, the flow of resources and capabilities offered by developmental agencies may be redirected to further facilitate the very groups and individuals they are intended to undermine. Corruption can also be seen as a collective enterprise, is not limited to the activities of individuals in isolation from one another, and may cost many millions.

Marred by corruption and inaction, local government agencies need to be held accountable to those from whom they receive funds and direction, and such regulatory systems need to be driven by agencies not associated with higher levels of government. This is because local government agencies may be subject to manipulation by overseers drawn from the same governmental structures, or may simply continue any problematic practices that have already been entrenched at the national level.

Terrorism has become a primary concern internationally, and remains a key issue in many developing countries. Many of the ten cities studied for this guide are situated in countries that have experienced, or continue to experience, forms of terrorism. Ranging from seemingly isolated events to long-term strategies of engagement that often result

in civil warfare, as in the case of Karachi below illustrates, attacking groups that are often deeply embedded locally poses some of the greatest risks to authorities.

Our studies of the ten cities suggest that the linkages between what are often referred to as distinct categories of phenomena – organised crime, corruption and terrorism – are difficult to disentangle on the ground (see also Shelley 2014). Each serves to shape the other with important overlaps between actors and the degree to which illicit economies empower the networks and associated power structures that are present. That does of course suggest an important degree of convergence between these issues. At the same time, there is also evidence of divergence: when illicit activities and organised crime itself sees a violent response, including that driven by ideologies of religious extremism. The point here though is that there are systemic connections on the ground, both between many of the actors involved and the degree to which they act together or in opposition to each other.

Karachi: distinguishing between crime, politics and terrorism?

In Karachi evidence from field interviews suggests that a web of players, some belonging to state institutions, but many who do not, such as individual entrepreneurs, criminals, political parties and the terrorist group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, have been providing services to majority of the city's residents – in particular, the most marginalised sections of the population. Karachi is home not only to local crime groups but also to international syndicates such as the D-Company, an organisation that pursues both criminal and terrorist activities. The city represents an urban battleground where different actors are fighting for control, and violence is the medium of communication. Almost all major political parties carry out extortion, target killings and kidnappings. These actions not only deregulated the marketplace of violent enterprises, they also formulated a blueprint of sorts for new players. One of these new players in the case of Karachi turned out to be the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.

In the same way political interests are funded by crime. Our study found that according to estimates provided by the confessional statement of an activist from a major political party in the 1990s, the annual value of money raised from extortion was 765 million Pakistani rupees. Such forms of organised crime have many uses, and indeed impact on industries and communities far removed from those traditionally thought of as illicit or illegal. The money was used for acquisition and storage of weapons, weapons training, legal defence, welfare of bereaved families of workers who died for the party, medical treatment of injured workers, funerals, public relations, and buying off witnesses in legal cases against the party and government functionaries (see Hussain 2015).

An important point noted here, and as is spoken to below, is that the concept of terrorism can itself be used both openly, as a way of justifying responses to legitimate threats, and surreptitiously, as a means of articulating artificial differences and rationalising divisive forms of governance which serve to undermine the prosperity of regions as a whole. Such forms of terrorism are thus often extremely complex, relying on a diverse range of actors and resources. 'Eliminating' one of these may have little effect

on the system as a whole, and will often provide fodder for potent forms of rhetoric that further strengthen these organisations' organisational capacity and ability to recruit new members. Such organisations may also interconnect with one another in ways not easily formalised, so that simply breaking down some forms of communication may not prevent or undermine continued operations or cooperative undertakings.

Thinking a way out

The idea that the local dynamics of cities can be shaped by global forces, and that some cities may now be seen as fragile, can be presented in ominous terms. However, and as systems-based ideas frequently highlight, such environments are also vital spaces for the creation of new opportunities. Those communities that have become unstable – far from equilibrium one might say – may often seem to be teetering on the brink of disaster. However, it is precisely because of this instability that opportunities exist for quicker and more substantive reforms. Those communities that are very stable are also slow to change should a problem or concern emerge, while communities that lack this stability may become useful pilot sites for important projects, the effects of which can be measured more rapidly and more genuinely than in more stable environments. It is critical then that difficult situations, complex dynamics and unstable communities are not isolated and forgotten because of the risks they present, but are seen as opportunities for leadership. To make effective changes in these places, understand why they are unstable, and prioritise projects aimed at championing their efforts to become safer and better places to live is critical for city governments.

Several of the examples in Part I illustrate that often what is at stake is the retrieval of governance from the hands of criminalised, corrupted and violent groups. Much of the challenge here relates to the legitimacy of state-provided governance itself. That is not something that can be easily reversed by the implementation of a series of isolated 'crime-prevention projects' and requires a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of how 'safety can be governed', an issue we will explore in greater detail in Part III.

It is clear then that action is needed, and that the forms this action takes needs to be cooperative and systemic. Understanding and making use of systems-based understandings of development and security allows one to both enable and strengthen local forms of governance, while ensuring that, at a broader level, efforts are synchronous and consolidated, and purposed with the creation of levels of development and safety that are substantive, rather than merely procedural. The development of large cities can have the effect of bringing prosperity and growth to entire regions. Such growth needs to be strategically guided, however, so as to ensure that not only is economic development supported, but that communities are fostered that are well serviced, well policed, and safe spaces which people can identify with and call home.

PART II: CREATING SHARED PRIORITIES

The centrality of analysis

Part I has pointed to the complex interconnections that drive insecurity in many cities. Responding to these is a key challenge for city governments. Without informed analysis a strategic response will be unlikely or different interests may drive a set of fragmented projects and programmes. Analysis must therefore be a process through which a set of shared priorities is identified. Several cities in the developing world have begun to experiment with a variety of approaches to measuring safety in the context of inequality and efforts to improve social cohesion. These, while critical steps forward, are generally very locally bounded and seldom take into account a wider set of external factors that may drive insecurity.

The South African Cities Network indicators project

The indicators project of the South African Cities Network, a central-government-funded network of all the country's major cities, is an attempt to define a series of measures related to social and structural risk factors and their linkage to levels of safety.



Figure 2: Three layers of indicators to measure safety in South African cities

As illustrated in the diagram above, indicators are divided across three levels: at the core are a series of measures of insecurity; followed by indicators that define inequality and social risk; and, finally, a set of indicators that measure cities' responses. The purpose of grouping indicators in this way is to measure a set of associated factors within one framework giving a single 'score card' of city progress across a number of areas relevant to achieving safety (see SACN 2015).

Part II seeks to take this thinking further by examining how cities in a globalised world might analyse issues of safety, with a focus on the links between illicit flows/markets and insecurity.

A system requires systems thinking

As suggested earlier in the guide, achieving either development or security is not a linear process, and the growth of cities is the product of a multiplicity of forces, both internal and external. Cities are not stagnant entities, but are shaped by the environments in which they occur and interact. The city is a system with its own internal currents. This point is fundamentally important – global forces can and do shape local dynamics by influencing how that system operates.

It is for this reason that a systems-based understanding of cities, and indeed interventions, has such utility: it helps to explain both how cities work and how outside forces may interact with local factors to shift or change the system in place. It is crucial to understand in designing projects and initiatives that will encourage the sustainable growth of urban areas that translates into the betterment of people's lives; these efforts need to be conceptualised, understood and made responsive to changing global environments.

This is especially true when attempting to facilitate or strengthen the safety of local communities – organised criminal activity, for instance, while shaped by global forces, is also invariably embedded in the norms and mores of specific communities, and thus measures using security forces may have the effect of further alienating these communities from the broader societies in which they occur, preventing a wider set of interventions. It is only when their histories, shared identities and reasons are understood that such situations, all too often seen across the globe, can be prevented.

While it may seem rather obvious when explained structurally, the devil is of course in the detail, and that detail needs to be guided by an understanding of both security and development that is holistic, self-reflexive and attuned to local dynamics.

It is for this reason that the analytical move towards recognising the importance of relationships, movements and systems is adopted by this guide. This is done, on the one hand, in an attempt to grasp the manner in which safety and development interrelate, and on the other, to provide a realistic representation of the cities and their dynamics as they are, *in situ*. The development of such representations – models, traditionally described – need to be attentive to the dynamics and processes that they are intended to represent.

In attempting to move away from overt simplification, it is however important to note that any model will necessarily be a simplified representation of reality. As Cilliers (2001: 2–3) concludes: 'Our models have to reduce this complexity in order to generate some understanding. In the process something is obviously lost. If we have a good model, we would hope that that which is left out is unimportant.' Crucially, the term complexity here does not mean 'very complicated', but 'never fully understandable'.

A Boeing 747 aircraft is, per example, an extremely complicated machine, but is not complex – however many individual parts there are, should one have the inclination, it would be possible to lay out each of these parts schematically, account for them, and re-assemble the machine. A city, however, is complex. There are many actors, many ‘parts’, yet they interact with each other and the external world in such a way that they can never all be accounted for. The recognition of this, that no model will ever accurately capture a city in its entirety, acknowledges the complexities that are cities.

A five-step process of analysis

How to apply a systems approach to an analysis of any city? What we propose here is a broad five-step process. While the outcome of this process may look very different in different cities, broadly the same set of analytical activities will be required in each case. Such a process can be conducted as part of a formal review or more informally in a series of discussions where evidence is presented in each of the areas. The important point here is that policy alternatives (which we will consider in Part III of the guide) must draw on this process. This analysis can also focus on individual parts of the city or for the city as a whole.

The five steps are as follows and are illustrated in Figure 3 below:

1. *Isolating the key flows that impact upon city security.*
2. *Linking these flows to specific forms of insecurity.*
3. *Understanding the complex local networks and dynamics of insecurity into which these flows intersect.*
4. *Isolating nodes or levers that could promote change.*
5. *Seeking out what builds resilience.*




Figure 3: A systems-oriented approach to analysing connections between global and local factors in building safety

1. Isolating flows that impact upon city insecurity

In different ways, every city is impacted upon by illicit external and internal ‘flows’. In most cases city authorities consider these flows either to be irrelevant to the day-to-day management of urban spaces, or at least to be someone else’s responsibility – usually that of the central government. Yet, as we have suggested above, such flows connect cities and are central to shaping many relationships and their associated networks.

What is an illicit ‘flow’?

This guide uses a relatively broad definition of ‘flows’, encompassing resource streams that move into or through urban complexes. Such flows include therefore a wide variety of commodities, from the more obvious like people and drugs, to the less apparent, such as illicit activities connected to city transport systems. Resources can be extracted from such flows in two ways: (1) through their movement (trafficking) and sale; and (2) through the extraction of protection payments by local powerholders. While some flows are by their nature legal, the illegality arises from how they are managed and/or the degree to which violence, or the threat of violence, is associated with them.

Our analysis across the ten cities identified several key flows that were relatively common and had a direct link to city safety. These are:

- people, both legal and illegal;
- illicit drugs;
- forms of transport, mainly privately managed taxis and buses;
- ideas, often related to religious extremism, but also to the spread of forms of gang organisation and culture;
- flows of money, including their investment in a series of activities at city level, most notably construction;
- illegal firearms; and
- illicit or counterfeit goods.

This is not to say that these are the only flows, just those that emerged most readily from our review of the case-study material.

The most obvious flow that shapes all cities, and one that we have already highlighted the extent of above, is the movement of people themselves. There are a number of elements to this, including legal and illegal movement, but the key point here is that flows of people will remain the defining force shaping most cities in the developing world. Identifying security challenges that result from people flows is thus of huge importance for the management of cities.

We should emphasise here that the movement of people brings many positive developments. Migrants from rural areas and other countries may bring new skills, are often committed to making new lives for themselves, and have levels of resilience that ‘insiders’ with more settled lives cannot hope to attain. However, our ten case studies

show only too well that flows of people that are badly managed can often cause significant levels of disruptive conflict and promote wider insecurity, including by undercutting the ability to promote and sustain economic growth.

Common across all of the city case studies is a second flow that appears to be of enormous consequence in almost every place: that of illegal drugs. In some cities, particularly our Latin American case studies, the impact of illicit drugs appears to be dramatic. This is particularly the case where the city is positioned at the intersection point of major drug-trafficking routes. However, in a surprising number of the cities illicit drug flows and their impact on security constitute an important challenge, particularly in the promotion and sustaining of different forms of organised crime and violence.

Istanbul at the intersection

Of all the cities considered for the purposes of this guide, Istanbul has arguably demonstrated some of the strongest institutions. In terms of levels of violence and crime, the city demonstrates much lower levels of reported cases than all the other case studies. At the same time, however, Istanbul's historical position on the major drug-trafficking routes to Europe has had important local impacts. The most detailed account of organised crime in Turkey argues that the state 'teetered on the edge of an Andean nightmare' in the mid-1990s as drug trafficking embedded itself in the body politic. This has enormous implications for both the degree of state penetration and the link between the drug trade and local terrorism. The so-called deep state, where elements of the state and the criminal underworld interlocked, assumed a critical role. Driven by a range of reasons, and after a specific incident in 1996, when a car crash on a country road involving a major criminal, a member of parliament and the former police chief of Istanbul, revealed an alarming level of criminal, political and police collusion, significant efforts were taken to clean up and reverse the process of 'criminal governance' (see Farrell 2015).

Perhaps surprisingly, the regulation of transport flows in and between cities emerged as a key driver of insecurity in several case studies. In cities such as Lagos and Cape Town, for example, systems of private transport, and competition with public ones, are key sources of violence and instability. Such transport systems, as the next section will suggest, are also more widely connected to the movement of illicit goods and people.

Harder to isolate is the flow of ideas. Our studies of each city have demonstrated that people are connected in ways that would have been unimaginable in the past. Ideas shape local organisations and ideologies. In Karachi, for example, extremist views are driven by a combination of internet exchanges and the inflow of new migrants from elsewhere in Pakistan, a good example of how both old and new flows may combine to form insecurity (Hussain 2015). But ideas on forms of criminal activity, such as kidnapping, may also now move faster, and specific ideas around gang organisation, culture and identity easily and now rapidly cross borders, most notably in our

Caribbean case study, where local gang formation is closely interconnected to North American developments (Marston 2015).

The movement of illicit funds to the cities was highlighted in several cases as a source of insecurity. Illicit funds in such cases may distort local development, promote unneeded construction (often symbolised by the unfinished skeletons of buildings) and feed into local political party funding. This reinforces the conclusions of a recent study by the OECD on illicit financial flows in West Africa which demonstrated that far from finding their way to off-shore banking zones, much of the illicit money was invested locally, for, among other things, the sustaining of networks of politics and protection (OECD 2016).

In several cities researchers identified the movement and flow of counterfeit and other goods as a source of insecurity, or at least a threat to public health and safety. Illegal firearms were also mentioned in several of our cases studies as causing instability and promoting an easy resort to violence.

Measuring flows at local level

The discussion on global flows is often reduced to a debate as how to measure their extent. Quantifying such flows is important, but not always essential. Much more critical is to understand the impact of the flows themselves (see the next section). Measuring the extent of a variety of flows is now often linked to seizures of that commodity, most pertinently in the case of illicit drugs. But it has long been understood that seizures do not provide an accurate reflection of the extent of flows: no seizures, for example, might mean that a flow is so well controlled, and law enforcement so corrupted, that nothing is seized.

A better alternative to measure the extent of different flows, particularly at local level, is to determine fluctuations in price for any commodity. Much more work is required at local level to acquire price data, but it is essential if city management is to understand more analytically the intersection between the global and the local. Local surveys of drug prices, for example, are a useful way to determine ongoing trends. Price also provides a way to judge whether a variety of regulatory or enforcement policies are having an effect: the higher the price rises the scarcer the goods, the lower the price the greater their availability. There is much scope for innovation in this area, and a set of price data across a variety of illicit markets will in the long term be essential to defining effective counter-strategies. City administrations, which often conduct surveys on a variety of topics, are well placed to take the lead here.

The explanation above is an introduction to an array of flows that might characterise any city and how they might be measured. How these may impact upon safety is considered in the next section.

2. Linking illicit flows to insecurity

Identifying how different illicit flows are linked to insecurity is a critical part of the analysis suggested here. In many cases the link may be less than obvious and will require a significant understanding of local markets and illicit flows.

Perhaps the most obvious example of the link between illicit flows and insecurity, including violence, is in relation to the control and marketing of illicit drugs. A wider literature has traced the connections between drug markets and violence (Andreas and Wallman 2009; Brownstein et al. 2000; Schneider 2013). The conclusions from these and other studies have applicability to other illicit markets too, and so it is valuable to summarise a series of four key conclusions here:

- The movement of illicit commodities generally requires some form of ‘protection’. The provision of that protection generally entails the payment (or forced payment) to a group or groups with the capacity for violence. Those who provide such protection generally are not engaged in the entrepreneurial function of trafficking or moving the goods.
- While seldom done with any precision, measuring levels of violence related to the ‘protection’ function provides an indication of how well regulated illicit markets may be. Regular criminal assassinations, for example, provide an indication that markets remain relatively difficult to regulate.
- The degree to which new entrants in criminal markets are met with violence provides an indication of the level of control or criminal governance over any market. If there is evidence that new players can enter the market with ease, there is a strong chance that the market is not well established or controlled.
- Territorial control of ‘turf’ by criminal or political actors is often linked to strong control of individual markets in these areas. Strong territorial control provides the ability to levy protection payments for illicit activities that occur or cross the territory.

The four points above provide a measure of the extent of ‘criminal governance’ in any industry. Such governance often provides a direct assessment of the ability of the state to intervene in an illicit market.

‘Criminal governance’ of the taxi industry in Cape Town

Placed against the four measures above, ‘criminal governance’ of the taxi industry in Cape Town is high. There is strong control of the market, regular payment for protection, the ejection of new entrants, and control of ‘turf’ in the form of individual routes by different associations. There is also a wider set of links to the broader criminal economy of the city, and the industry, while providing an important service, is a source of significant insecurity for local commuters.

The mini-bus taxi industry in Cape Town constitutes a source of considerable violence. While conflict around the taxi industry is now much less open than in the past, it often

takes the form of assassinations of drivers and taxi owners, and insiders report that there remains considerable tension and hidden violence. There are regular reports of officials, drivers and commuters being shot at, killed or injured. The taxi industry is a highly lucrative source of funding for a series of 'taxi bosses' and there are strong links between some taxi associations and gangs in the city.

The ability of the city and the government to regulate the taxi industry is constrained by the violence emanating from the industry, the issue of corruption, and the degree to which a form of criminal governance is in place. Different routes are the 'turf' of individual associations, and new entrants are ejected with violence. Individual taxis pay a fee to 'mother bodies' who have enormous power and influence, including maintaining hit-squads to act against competitors. There are strong ties to local politics and other illicit markets (see Western Cape Government 2005).

The brief introduction here has focused on links between illicit markets/flows and insecurity. One of the key challenges remains collecting specific data that illustrates these links. Thus, for example, few if any police agencies in the developed or developing world collect information on gang violence, criminal 'hits' or vigilante killings. All three categories are of some importance in measuring the degree to which violence is associated with illicit markets and 'criminal governance'. Where possible cities may play an important role in fostering or supporting better data collection, including through the support of civil society. In addition, cities may usefully measure the degree to which their residents feel unsafe in different areas, using changes in that data as an indication of the success or failure of city-led policies.

Counting homicide in Karachi

There is some consensus that police figures of violence in Karachi do not provide an accurate measure of its extent. One important source of data for the city however is Edhi, a private philanthropic institution that provides ambulance services across Karachi. Sadly, Edhi is more likely to carry victims who are already dead, or died on the way to hospital, than it is to carry injured persons. This data provides a detail insight into the nature of violence in Karachi, including its distribution and the causes of death, which are simply not available in as comprehensive form from any other sources (see UNODC 2014).

3. Local networks, resourcing and changing forms of power

We have explored the connection between illicit flows and insecurity in the section above. But a critical process of analysis is required to understand how local dynamics interface with external flows. The wider literature highlights that it is relationships that become the fundamental drivers of events and actors in the world. Indeed, relationships are at the very heart of this guide, situated at the intersections of each city's development and continuing security, between organised crime, corruption and terrorism, and between these phenomena and local developments.

In taking into account these many relationships, however, a problem emerges. Traditionally, relationships have been understood as linear – A has an influence on B, and B influences C (and so on). However, such a linear representation of the world, especially in investigating the contemporary relationship between development and security, is clearly limited. Not only does the development of an urban space not guarantee that its security will be enhanced, but, as has been briefly shown above, it may have the exact opposite effect.

That this effect was not accounted for in the past, it may be argued, is a function of the analytical lens used: the assumption that the world is somehow predictable and stable, when in reality it is anything but, is reflected here in the inaccuracy of the model. In moving beyond this, we argue here that relationships are non-linear and not predictable in any great way. By non-linear it is meant that relationships may emerge, dissolve or change in multiple ways with multiple partners simultaneously, and that these changes and movements cannot really be predicted.

With this in mind, we therefore understand relationships through a non-linear paradigm – relationships are spheres of influence that create or prevent change in the world. City governments seldom map out social relations. Yet achieving safety requires a better understanding of the political economies of relations between different actors in a system. What has seldom been studied – and recent analyses emphasise as crucial – is the impact that external resource flows may have on individual groups with the propensity to cause either violence/insecurity or promote safety.

How resources strengthen, weaken or fragment organisations

Not all networks and groups are the same. An injection of resources has a very different impact on different groups, depending on how they are organised and what ideas (ideologies) hold them together. Drawing on the work of Paul Staniland (2014), who rejects a linear interpretation of social phenomena, we identify three typologies of how external flows may impact upon local organisations:

1. Groups built on strong horizontal and vertical networks are likely to use lucrative resource flows for 'state-like' tasks including the use of violence.
2. Loosely organised groups where the flows of resources are dependent on the control of lower levels of the network (think gang drug-distribution networks or taxi and transport associations) will use violence internal to secure resource flows. 'Disorganisation' is required at the bottom for the top to secure profits.
3. Groups built on weak networks of cooperation will face problems of indiscipline and then fragmentation as resource flows exacerbate pre-existing organisational divisions.

Staniland concludes that 'this variation shows that we need to focus less on resources themselves than on the social and institutional contexts into which they flow. An interactive approach that considers multiple factors is necessary instead of relying on easy platitudes about criminalization and greed' (ibid.: 228).

4. Isolating nodes or levers that promote change

Nodes may comprise: individuals, groups (and parts of groups); organisations (and parts of organisations); or states. They may be large or small, tightly or loosely connected and inclusive or exclusive in membership; they may engage in similar activities, or they may be specialised to undertake particular tasks. A node can be seen as a structural focal point around which relationships converge or diverge. A node, thus, may be a central business district towards which the systems that support such enterprises (such as, for instance, courier services, communications infrastructure and so on) converge, or it may be a port to and from which container ships arrive and depart in their voyages around the world.

Less grandly, a node can be a traffic circle towards which traffic flows or a local police station central to the safety of a community. A person may be a node, in that they occupy a position that is central to the continued functioning of a system, such as a director or financial officer. Regardless of forms, understanding the conceptual relevance and pragmatic utility of nodes is important.

In a system or network in which relationships are the manner by which it functions and around which structures are created and sustained, nodes are the primary points at which said system may be influenced. As Wood and Dupont point out, such networks are 'continuous, iterative and more or less temporary processes carried out by a range of ... actors (nodes) according to different positions of power' (quoted in Shearing and Johnston 2010: 498).

The introduction of the concept of power is important here. In any system, the nodes will be of differing importance – using the example of a road system, a multilevel pass-over will be more important to the system than a small traffic circle, not because it is 'better' in any sense but because it is more central to the continued functioning of that system.

Feedback loops are cycles that can be either positively or negatively reinforced. When positively reinforced, the cycle will grow stronger. When negatively reinforced, the cycle will grow weaker. Feedback loops are now commonly used analytical tools, and have been accepted as a useful means of conceptualising processes that occur over time and in reaction to external elements.

The levels of violence in a community, for instance, may become cyclical – in environments in which the use of coercive force by police officers further creates relationships of antagonism in the communities, the levels of violence experienced by that community will be heightened. This can be seen as a positive feedback loop.

In contrast, community-driven policing efforts may increase the overall health of the community, while further encouraging the incorporation of those people who may have previously been external to it, thus positively reinforcing the overall health and dynamism of the cohort in their responses to crime. This would have a negative effect on

the overall levels of violence experienced by the community, thus negatively affecting the cycles of violence.

The Fusion Project: creating a positive feedback loop

The city of Cape Town has long been marred by the presence of deeply embedded gang structures, primarily drawing on the mythology of 'the Number'. These gangs are hierarchically defined, disciplined, and have positioned themselves at the epicentre of a variety of organised criminal activities in the city. Their mantra of 'blood in, blood out' makes the reform of individuals very difficult, and few projects have experienced successes. The one project that stands above this, Fusion, attributes its success to the use of the same structures that define the gangs as a means of reform. The gang structure has been replicated, but the outputs have not – rather than deal drugs, participants tend vegetable gardens. What the project has found is that the outputs are of little concern – young men join gangs because they provide them with a space and place in which to define themselves. This is their power, and the basis for members' loyalty. Simply removing individuals to jail has no effect, as the gangs are strongest in the prisons. What Fusion does, however, is break the cycle of violence by providing individuals with what they need – an understanding of who they are – beyond the socio-economic impetus to partake in criminal activity. The result is a startlingly simple yet powerful conclusion: as a function of the failure of the state, gangsterism is for these young men a means by which to provide a narrative of themselves, and criminality itself is merely a means of expressing this narrative.

5. Seeking out what builds resilience

The notion of resilience, which is now being used in a variety of contexts ranging from the governmental to the psychological, has its contemporary origins in ecological studies. Within this literature it refers to the ability of an ecological system to weather events or processes that are disruptive to the system. This can be through isolated occurrences or through multiple (and at times repetitive) points of contact.

A resilient ecological system is thus one that can mitigate the effects of disruption through adaption – the ability of a rainforest to regrow and repopulate an area disrupted by logging activities stands as a classic example. As the concept of resilience has developed and been used, both within the ecological arena and in other contexts, it has come to include not only adaption but mitigation, both of which might be understood as congruent aspects of the same process.

Mitigation is preventative, the ability of a system to respond to a threat in such a way as to decrease or eliminate that threat's potential. Adaption, on the other hand, speaks to a system's ability to transform itself in response to or in anticipation of a threat or disruption. The latter is however actively driven – the resilience of the system is a function of its ability to respond to threats and disruptions it had not anticipated. This can also be dealt with as a result of the system's structures and design. In both instances,

every point of contact is subject to change, and every system will be fundamentally altered by any disruption. As Muggah (2012: 352) notes,

... urban decay and disorder need not imply that cities cannot rebound and ultimately transform for the better. To the contrary, it is the very resilience of cities that offers a pathway out of fragility and a wellspring of resistance and agency from which insights must be drawn. If designed correctly however, these changes further strengthen the system.

Drawing parallels with robotics, the system is dynamic and intelligent, and becomes better able to deal with new responses with the onset of each threat or disturbance. The important point to make here is that a well-designed system is made stronger each time it faces a disruption, and an attempt to repair it. The development and implementation of these systemic considerations in the creation of safer communities, by creating resilient lives, is the primary aim of the project. Thus in the context of the guide we use the concept of 'resilient lives' to refer to the empowerment of individuals and communities to effectively engage with and adapt to both risks that are anticipated and those that are not, at the points at which they become harmful or disruptive. We return to the issue of resilience in Part III of the guide.

What drives crime in Mexico City?

In all cities crime, or at least certain types of crime, are concentrated in only some places. That is extremely well demonstrated in a recent detailed study of crime in Mexico City that showed that in central and wealthier areas crime has in fact been declining, although overall levels for the city have increased. But what then drives the increases in crime in the city? The researchers showed that high degrees of social disorganisation or anomie are strongly associated with high levels of crime in neighbourhoods and slum areas in the city. Social disorganisation was measured through a series of proxy indicators for social inequality, the level of in-migration, the number of female-headed households and the number of bars/restaurants.

That reinforces older research which shows that victims and their perpetrators in a high proportion of crimes live near to each other, that crime is significantly higher in rental and large housing blocks, and that tight neighbourhood forms of organisation, particularly those that involve young men, are major contributing factors for crime. Again, the term social disorganisation suggests that these neighbourhoods are not *not* 'governed': in fact, tight forms of governance may be in place, with these being crime promoting rather than crime reducing.

The authors urge the use of interventions that build the social organisation of the high-crime zones, suggesting that only using police interventions, which are seen as a first resort, will do little to bring down crime, and may cause greater distance between official and unofficial forms of governance. In such an argument building greater social organisation is a means to achieve higher levels of resilience within the community (see Vilalta and Muggah 2016).

A final word: people as data

The use of statistical and numerical data, especially when encompassing entities as large as cities, often has the effect of decontextualising the lives of the people who make up those numbers. The concept of development can be articulated through many lenses, such as economic growth, education rates and access to healthcare, but this data can for instance, never be divorced from an important albeit often implicit normative concept, that of betterment. In the process of quantifying human life, it should never be forgotten that developmental policy frameworks, strategies, and toolkits should always be attentive to the manner in which they describe and understand the people they are intended to help. Simply pathologising entire communities as 'victims' or, with regards to concerns about insecurity, 'innately' criminal, belies the complexity of the lives that make up these systems.

Furthermore, that a policy or strategy may produce positive numeric indicators may not necessarily translate into the improvement of resident's environments in real terms. In short, to do justice to the normative impulses informing the concept of development requires that the complexity of the relationships and interactions that define people's lives are taken seriously. Not doing so prioritises the politics of development over the betterment of lives and reduces individuals to mere points of measurement.

Forethought, care and attention, above all else, is required for development to be reflected in substantive changes in individuals' lives, rather than simply procedural changes to the statistical models used in their quantification.

From analysis to action

The general focal areas for consideration and data collection that are presented here are only a broad framework. Cities must determine for themselves the key areas that must be researched. Nevertheless, it is suggested that for many cities, research has focused only on local dynamics without a broader understanding of how flows connect to prevailing forms of violence and criminal governance. This is the central suggestion of Part II: that is, to understand holistically what is driving and resourcing forms of alternative governance which bring violence and deepen the divide between people and state and city institutions. Part III examines the development of strategic responses based on the assessments proposed here.

PART III: SAFETY GOVERNANCE

Why 'safety governance'?

The term 'safety governance' captures the complicated and interlinked set of policy and implementation processes that are required to achieve safety in any locality. It is important to emphasise that safety governance entails the *integration* of responses to achieve a safe environment. Safety governance is a multi-dimensional 'product', and city authorities must take the lead in achieving it.

Safety governance is related to, but distinct from, the extensively used concept of 'good governance', which emphasises governance that is equitable, inclusive, participatory, transparent, accountable, efficient, effective, responsive, and adheres to the rule of law. Such principles are essential to realising a more wide-ranging understanding of safety, but the conceptualisation of good governance is limited in that it typically only focuses on the means of governing, not the end result.

Safety governance is outcome-oriented: it seeks to enhance the well-being of people and societies through the appropriate management and allocation of safety resources across the city. This requires a strategic approach that both seeks to integrate different approaches and the different spaces that make up the city, with safety being a core objective.

Prerequisites for success

The previous sections have shown just how challenging it is for cities to respond to the insecurities that characterise the interaction between local conditions and global flows. How they do so, however, will define their success in an evolving world. The challenge is enormous: our case studies demonstrate the difficulties of achieving effective solutions in complex and contested social and political spaces. At the same time, they suggest an important set of prerequisites for success. While these depend on the particular local environment present in each city, they also represent a common set of principles around which city-based interventions could be framed. The *seven* prerequisites for building effective systems of safety governance are:

- *Leadership:* City governments must take responsibility for their own safety, drawing on their own as well as other resources. That does not mean that safety issues are not a national or regional competency, only that safety is a key cross-cutting requirement that must be recognised as a priority by cities. There is no case on record where security was achieved in a city without leadership from the city government itself.
- *Resources:* Achieving safety is not possible without an investment of resources. Resources are not only financial, they are also represented by the time and commitment of communities and their leaders. Funds that support only enforcement interventions will fail to achieve success. Resources must be

applied where the problems are and they must actively support a set of programmes that complement each other.

- *Cooperation between all levels of government:* In many cases responsibilities for different functions related to crime control and prevention are dispersed across levels of government. Roles and responsibilities remain unclear. There is often institutional conflict between city, regional and national governments, particularly (but not only) if they are governed by elected representatives from different political parties. Effective policy responses absolutely require a coherent response across and between government departments.
- *Analysis and monitoring:* Understanding the scale and drivers of the challenge is the bedrock of designing an effective response. A strategy without analysis is likely to be more a product of political requirements that distorts the allocation of funds and constrains the number and/or nature of programmes that can be applied. Monitoring is the ongoing process of recording change and responding to it. It is essential.
- *Innovation and experimentation:* Our review of the experiences of the ten cities suggests that success was often only achieved rarely, and then only when old ways of doing things were rethought and new ideas tried. In the complex environment in which most cities find themselves, many policy responses will by definition be locally contingent. That provides important space for innovation and experimentation. Direct transfer of policy approaches from one city to others is unlikely to take account of local conditions and requirements.
- *People-focused:* The objective of the strategy and associated programmes must be to improve the lives and safety of people. While there may be other objectives this single reality must stand at the centre. People-focused programmes are also consultative and respectful of the conditions, resources and needs of local communities.
- *A mix of practical and symbolic actions:* Effective governance is almost always a mix of both practical interventions and symbolic gestures. While it is accepted that practical outcomes must be achieved, symbolic measures may be no less important. These range from the activities of individual leaders in promoting behaviours to the conducting of high-profile law-enforcement operations and/or arrests.

If any one of these elements is missing the chances of success being achieved are much reduced.

Safety governance strategies

If any effort to address systemic insecurity is to be successful, it will require a strategic approach that has buy-in from all of the relevant institutions and partners. A loose

collection of ideas and fragmented initiatives does not constitute a strategy. A strategy is a clearly defined overview of the challenge and a set of responses designed to meet it. A strategy that defines roles and responsibilities, which is concise and clear, underpinned by the necessary resources to achieve the results and which can be measured, provides the foundation for success.

Strategic turn-around in Lagos

Prior to 2007, insecurity was a defining characteristic of Lagos. Brazen robberies and murder in the city were widely reported. Foreign governments periodically issued statements warning their citizens about insecurity in the city, with attendant negative consequences for foreign investment and the country's image within the international community. Cases of murder by robbers, militias, touts at motor parks and other criminals were common.

High levels of crime in the city eroded safety and quality of life, economic activities and the legitimacy of the government. The problem of insecurity in the city was linked to intertwined problems such as high and rapidly growing population, sprawling slums, unemployment, poor infrastructure and services, inefficient security agencies and weak governance institutions. Achieving a safer Lagos seemed unattainable.

Babatunde Raji Fashola was sworn in as the governor of Lagos State on 29 May 2007. He explicitly recognised the impediment that insecurity constituted for the development of the mega-city and introduced a strategy to address the problem. Measures that turned out to be very significant for improved safety were the establishment of the Lagos State Security Trust Fund; reform of the criminal justice system; demolition of illegal structures to 'recapture' the ungoverned spaces within the city; improved infrastructure at motor parks and markets, many of which harboured criminals and gangs; strengthening local community crime watch groups; and improved transportation.

Most significant among the measures taken to improve security in Lagos was the establishment of the Lagos State Security Trust Fund in 2007. Legislation to this effect was the first law that passed the state legislature under Fashola's tenure, underscoring the importance the governor attached to improving safety in Lagos. The Fund mobilised resources from both public and private sectors and allocated them to safety improvement programmes, including funding the police.

Other initiatives were the introduction of non-custodial sentences, including community service, probation and restitution; and the establishment of the Directorate for Citizens' Rights, a Public Interest Defence Team and the Citizens' Mediation Centre. In August 2012 a Road Traffic Law was enacted; its implementation was reported to have led to a decrease in 'armed robbery involving the use of motorcycle', a common crime in the city which had symbolised the inability of the authorities to bring safety.

Analysis of responses obtained from interviews with 58 operators and commuters at several markets and motor parks in the city for this guide indicated that security has improved in Lagos. More than nine-tenths (91.4%) of the respondents said that security

has improved in the city. Evidence of improvement provided included a decrease in crime, and frequent patrolling of the streets by the police. More than seven-tenths (70.7%) said that police performance has improved over the past five years.

The core lesson from the Lagos city experience is that improved security requires a multiplicity of legal, social and political measures, and partnership among diverse stakeholders (Alemika 2015).

Four key components must all be present in any strategic response to the challenges that have been outlined in the guide, and it is not sufficient to expect that a strong response in one area – for example, in enforcement – will be sufficient to achieve a new safety paradigm. Advancement must be made in a comprehensive way across all areas, each of these must be based on in-depth analytical work, and programmes and activities in each should seek to complement each other. Each of the seven principles above must be applied not only to the strategy as a whole but to activities in each of four individual components. These are:

1. *Regulation*
2. *Enforcement*
3. *Engagement*
4. *Resilience*



Figure 4: The key elements of a safety governance strategy

Importantly, all of these activities must be conducted within the framework of achieving greater *inclusion* for marginalised and excluded groups.

These elements are each related to each other. They are arranged here from short term to longer-term interventions with the former providing the policy space to allow the

development of systems of engagement and the building of community resilience. Each is discussed in turn below.

1. Regulation

As the explanations in Parts I and II suggest, criminal activities and violence often result from a lack of regulation. Regulation is the means by which governance is applied to markets, both licit and illicit, to prevent or mitigate harm. Thus, for example, the failure to effectively manage and regulate the private commuter taxi industry in Cape Town and the motor parks in Lagos have had serious consequences for governance. The key objective of regulation by cities is to avoid the consequences of ‘criminal governance’.

Avoiding ‘criminal governance’

‘Criminal governance’ refers to the phenomena where criminal interests regulate markets themselves, either because these are illegal or because state institutions are weak and corrupted. Extortion is the classic case of criminal governance: ‘protection’ is sold to people on the basis that the sellers are themselves the source of any potential violence and disruption. Forms of extortion are reported to be present in almost all of the ten cities studied. As extortion illustrates, criminal governance is a distortion of open and transparent forms of governance: it benefits only a few and often militates against sustainable economic activities. Shopping and restaurant areas where there is extortion often die slow deaths as they are starved of investment. The primary aim of city-based regulation is to avoid ‘criminal governance’.

The effective regulation of a range of economic activities is one of the most effective long-term ways in which to manage criminal activities and their potential to affect safety. Regulatory activities in relation to illicit flows and markets can be divided into two broad categories:

- *The regulation of what would generally be regarded as legal activities but where the state has some obligation to manage these to prevent harm and criminal governance.* The improvement of the regulation of motorcycles in Lagos is an example. In other circumstances the regulation of markets in illicit alcohol (where the drinking of alcohol is not illegal) constitutes another case.
- *The regulation of sets of activities that have an impact on illegal markets.* This for example may relate to the regulation or certification of security company activities (‘bouncers’) in nightclubs where drugs are sold, or where violence is prevalent.

In both cases, regulation is about effectively governing aspects of an illicit or licit market to ensure that criminal governance, with its associated violence and price distortions, does not prevail.

The markets that are the most difficult to regulate are those that were not regulated in the beginning, making later state intervention particularly difficult to manage. That

requires sensitive but firm action by state actors. It cannot only be an enforcement action, but also requires a range of other economic incentives. This suggests that regulation may be most effectively implemented when market actors are relatively disorganised and in competition with each other. Effective market regulation, particularly when state capacities are weak, may often be as much about timing as capacity.

It should be emphasised that city governments have multiple regulatory powers related to crime prevention and control. These are usually administered by specific departments within municipalities without recourse to a wider strategy. Regulation in the following areas have enormous importance for the interface between external flows and local forms of governance:

- traffic flows, vehicular access and licensing of drivers, as in the case of responses to armed robbery in Lagos described above;
- business permits, for example, for hotels and other forms of accommodation that might serve as venues for sex trafficking;
- liquor licences, given the role that the consumption of alcohol in certain circumstances may be linked to violence;
- housing allocation, particularly if controlled or influenced by gang or organised-crime interests;
- private transport, including where it can be used and who controls its governing associations;
- building permits, particularly in cases where construction is undertaken with the objective of laundering illicit funds.

These are only some examples, and the role and functions of city government may vary in different places. These processes of regulation, such as the issuing of permits or licences, are often targeted by organised crime. In almost all cities in the developing world licensing systems suffer from some level of corruption. Such jobs are often literally 'for sale' given that they may generate extensive private incomes. Ensuring the integrity of these processes should be an urgent focus of city leaders: effectively applied, they constitute one of the most effective local tools against criminal governance.

2. Enforcement

Enforcement is often considered to be the 'silver bullet' that will solve crime and violence problems. An over-reliance on policing strategies, however, by failing to address root causes of local inequalities, marginalisation or exclusion, have been shown to exacerbate rather than mitigate the drivers undermining safety. Enforcement is an important component of a response, but one that should be viewed as a specific instrument in a holistic strategy that includes longer-term initiatives. At the same time, if conducted within the framework of the rule of law and with an emphasis on building community support, enforcement may serve as one of the most important elements in bridging relations between people and police and between different parts of a divided

city. Jill Leovy's powerful study of the failure of police enforcement during gang violence in south central Los Angeles concludes:

If every murder and every serious assault against a black man on the streets were investigated with Skagg's [a police detective] ceaseless vigor and determination – investigated as if one's own child were the victim, or as if we, as a society, could not bear to lose these people – conditions would have been different. If the system had for years produced the very high clearance rates that Skaggs was sure was possible ... the violence would not have been so routine. The victims would not have been so anonymous, and ... might have not died the nearly invisible, commonplace way in why [they] did. (Leovy 2015: 306)

City governments with weak capacity often find enforcement their most difficult task. That is because cities in the developing world generally have to rely on national or regional police to perform the enforcement function and often have little way to influence policing priorities and objectives. All ten cities studied for the production of this guide did not control policing resources. In some cases, city leaders specifically state that policing is not in their jurisdiction and so they are unable to influence most aspects of safety. This is an approach that is designed to fail: lack of safety is blamed on city governments even if their responsibilities and resources are limited in this area. Also, enforcement must be part of any overall strategy to ensure safety. City governments therefore appear to rely on three strategies to achieve this:

- Cities, often by *stretching the definition of their functions*, most notably that in respect of 'crime prevention', appoint their own enforcement or quasi-enforcement agencies. This includes the use for example of civilians or private security personal to patrol streets or regulate parking.
- Mayors apply *direct political pressure* at the highest levels of government to ensure that national or federal resources are deployed to respond to crime. This is easier in capital cities or those that generate considerable amounts of economic activity (Karachi is a good example here), but is much more difficult for middle-level cities, particularly if they are controlled by political interests other than those of national government.
- City governments *establish joint fora* with the national or regional police where they seek to set priorities, and in some cases monitor them. These are often relatively weak in their ability to influence police actions. Nevertheless, they are critical in achieving a degree of coordination between city and police actions.

Many cities may use all three of the alternatives outlined here. That underscores the critical requirement to influence the nature of city-based policing. Most important here is to align city actions, for example at the most basic level, cleaning up a blighted part of the city, with police deployments to ensure that progress is retained. Our research studies suggest that written agreements, plans or 'work programmes' between national and city authorities may at least provide a more formal basis for cooperation that may be measured.

The Khayelitsha Commission in Cape Town

When city governments do not have direct control over the police they may resort to a variety of ways to bring pressure for reform. A good example of this is the Khayelitsha Commission in Cape Town.

From 2003 to 2012 community-based organisations in Khayelitsha held repeated protests as to the poor state of policing. They were supported in their efforts by a vocal and highly organised civil society sector, led by the Social Justice Coalition (SJC). Levels of crime were of great concern to residents: serious crimes such as murder and attempted murder had increased greatly since 2009 and most property crimes were not reported due to a lack of trust by the community in the police. Between 2001 and 2009 the number of criminal cases opened against the police increased by 363%. The SJC also documented cases illustrating serious systemic failures in the functioning of the criminal justice system that led to a loss of public trust in the police.

In August 2012 the premier of the Western Cape established the Khayelitsha Commission to investigate and recommend improvements to achieve greater safety. This came after a period of high-profile political clashes and a challenge by the central government as to her right to do so. The dispute went to the Constitutional Court, which ruled that the premier had the right to establish the Commission.

The Commission, led by two respected figures, one of whom was a former Constitutional Court judge, opened offices in Khayelitsha, inviting members of the public to make statements regarding the safety situation. Extensive evidence was heard over a number of months. The commissioners submitted a final report in August 2014 that contained detailed recommendations on both police reform and the role of the city authorities. The report is seen as a landmark in the evolving debate on improving safety for some of Cape Town's poorest and most marginalised residents. A process is now under way to implement the recommendations.

In several of the cities studied (Karachi, Kingston, Cape Town and others) military resources have been used to police the cities. This happened after protest from city leaders that all other alternatives have failed. Using the military is a last resort and, while it allows situations to stabilise, it does not solve the long-term problems of safety. In extreme cases, such as Karachi, military deployments are likely to retain a degree of permanence that was not envisaged at the outset. If militaries are to be deployed, city governments must emphasise that these are 'stabilisation operations' and urge governments to strengthen policing capacities.

Karachi: balancing military and police responses

The Sindh Rangers, a paramilitary force deployed in Karachi, provides an important set of lessons for reforming local policing. The Rangers are an efficient and neutral player in a city divided along ethnic, religious and political affiliations. Although crime and violence levels have ebbed and risen in the city despite their presence in Karachi for the

past twenty-six years, it is less a verdict on the performance of Rangers than a result of the larger failure of government policies to address root causes of instability in Karachi. The Rangers represent a stop-gap measure to address Karachi's problems; they are a border protection force and not a law-enforcement institution.

The Rangers were called in 1989 to help the civilian government in Karachi to restore law and order. It was a temporary solution, but gained permanence over the years. During the 1990s two more military operations were carried out with the assistance of Rangers. The gains were temporary. The Rangers were successful in reclaiming some 'no-go' areas in the city. However, violence returned later in the decade, lending support to the argument that such operations failed to address the root causes of instability in Karachi. The complexity of the city's social and political terrain has only increased since then. For instance, in present-day Karachi there are alliances between criminals and terrorists, each of which can keep their identity distinct as either of the categories, or align themselves with a political and/or religious cause, making it harder to target them.

In hindsight, the lessons that could be learnt from these military operations are that the government introduced a border-protection force in the city which was not trained to operate in densely populated spaces. In addition, it was not answerable to the local government, thereby creating resentment amongst local players (see Hussain 2015).

None of the explanation above solves the essential conundrum for city leaders as to their weak hold over law-enforcement capacity. This is unlikely to change in the near future, as policing will remain centralised, if perhaps more responsive to local needs in some countries and cities. Yet, there may be advantages in cities not having access to policing resources: it focuses city efforts on longer-term violence and crime prevention programmes, which are often neglected – including by central governments. It is for this reason that some of the most innovative crime-prevention initiatives have often emerged in cities without their own police.

Critical in this regard may be initiatives that increase the capacity for human surveillance in the absence of sufficient or effective policing resources. Systems that promote the deployment of large numbers of people, often linked together with communication technology, who perform other tasks (such as parking regulation or static guarding) but who provide a network of surveillance, have proved effective. In short, in the absence of effective control over policing resources, the best response for city officials may be to build wider systems of surveillance, often through the use of currently appointed city personnel or through partnerships with other actors, in order to channel policing resources where they are most required.

3. Engagement

Engagement and communication remain among the most important tools that city officials may have in fostering inclusive, resilient and law-abiding societies. Too often, however, particularly in the case of marginalised and excluded groups, cities engage and communicate poorly, and pay the price later when projects have been built and systems implemented. Building marginalised groups into decision making and reaching out to

people beyond identified 'community leaders' remains a key challenge in all cities. Genuine engagement and communication that allows for feedback remains essential, but is challenging in often fragile and fragmented environments.

Such processes of engagement can never be separated from the rough-and-tumble of politics in divided cities. The Khayelitsha Commission considered above provides ample evidence of this. Development agency exhortations that crime and violence reduction strategies should be de-politicised are almost impossible to realise on the ground. As a recent comparative study of three cities in Colombia have shown, the response to high levels of violence is deeply shaped by politics – it is not and cannot be a neutral process: responses are 'inherently political because they can either preserve or reshape the distribution of resources and power in [cities] historically characterised by socio-economic inequality and exclusionary politics' (Moncada 2016). The role of powerful business interests and their alignment with reforming political actors appears to be a critical ingredient for success.

Business, safety and politics in three Latin American cities

In a path-breaking recent study of urban violence strategies in Bogota, Cali and Medellín, Eduardo Moncada concluded that the link between dominant business interests and city governments was crucial for success. Strong linkages between local public and private sectors facilitate the sharing of resources and information, build trust and help resolve conflict. In Bogotá and Medellín strong public-private linkages facilitated advanced participatory responses to urban violence. There was extensive collaboration between local government and business actors which generated wider domestic and international support for tackling inequality and deepening local political participation. But, where such linkages were absent, as in Cali, efforts to respond to violence not only failed but degenerated into political conflict that eroded support for a redistribution of resources and a participatory and more inclusive process (see Moncada 2016).

Such processes of engagement also raise important questions as to who should be engaged, leading to often difficult decisions as to the requirement to negotiate with those, such as local strong men or gang leaders, who have themselves been engaged in crime and violence. For example, a negotiated gang truce in El Salvador did dramatically bring down levels of violence, only for gang-related conflict to spiral again when the truce fell apart. The gangs had used the period of 'peace' to reorganise and rearm, highlighting that engagement and negotiation must always be part of a wider strategy of resilience building. In short, there are no easy answers and it is not possible to reduce processes of engagement to apolitical, neutral and technical discussions around safety. The way forward in each case must be carefully judged and implemented with an understanding of the political dynamics standing at the centre, rather than that being pushed off to one the side as outside the scope of a 'technocratic' focus on crime prevention.

Politics, as the saying goes, is also about effective communication. Yet the challenge of effective communication on the issue of safety in the communications age has barely

been broached. Perhaps the very first challenge in the policy-making community is to recognise the extent to which illicit markets and 'deviant' groups are enabled by social media. Cities, given their populations and their connectedness, are at the forefront of these trends. Many senior city officials and policy makers, however, are from another generation, not always aware of the extent of the cross-over between the illicit and the burgeoning communications opportunities offered by cyberspace. Our review of initiatives both in and external to the ten city case studies suggests that responses are generally experimental and fragmented.

While communication responses to illicit activities remain experimental, and no real cases of success are yet available, we know enough from these to at least provide a set of broad guidance principles and ideas as to what may work (see Reitano and Trabulsi 2016):

- Critically, social media messaging is often reactive to an established 'message' from illicit market or violent actors. What is required is to create a new narrative of inclusion rather than one that is simply reactive to an already established one. If they are to be successful, city social media campaigns have to sustain a communication campaign focused on inclusion and belonging and the promotion of narratives of peace and engagement.
- Importantly, social media is by definition interactive. Cities cannot only broadcast, but must also respond. Dedicated and skilled resources are required to achieve that. Social media campaigns must be linked to actions on the ground, particularly if they seek to build a narrative that city governments are making a difference. If programmes are advertised or communicated or responded to on social media, they must prove to be effective in the lived experience of residents. Creating a social media campaign with no capacity to deliver where people engage with city institutions will weaken the bonds between the city and, in particular, young people.
- The use of social media platforms that are driven by local users but facilitated by city officials offers a chance to create new narratives around safety – and ones that are aimed at providing practical solutions. For example, social media exchanges which report where violence is occurring so that people can avoid those places is of use both to ordinary citizens and to city and enforcement officials. At the same time, social media networks that record and report local corruption have been shown to be effective. There is thus an enormous amount of scope to develop new programmes in this respect. Where these are occurring, however, they are often the initiative of private citizens and groups rather than city governments.
- In extreme cases city officials may focus on shutting down social media users that advocate violence or criminal activities on-line. That will require the support of the private sector, and may potentially involve an approach to the justice system, depending on the circumstances. But ending abusive or violent messaging carries an important symbolic message in its own right. In fact, the goal may be not to shut down voices or channels, but to open space for new and multiple channels which allow for new competing voices.

In summary, to communicate effectively cities increasingly require a social media presence to both monitor information and create a new narrative. At the same time, city governments may gain enormous credibility from initiating or 'hosting' social media campaigns that report on violence, corruption and inefficiencies with service delivery. What is essential, however, is to ensure that there is concrete capacity to deliver effective responses on the ground. Such initiatives may well be part of what Mosés Naím has termed 'the coming surge of political innovation' (2013: 243), which will be essential if cities are to catch up and harness the tools that many of their residents now communicate with and through.

4. Resilience

Part II of the guide showed that analysis of how external flows shifted or distorted local behaviours was crucial. Under the heading of 'resilience' we consider ways in which communities and/or groups of people within the city that are identified as being particularly vulnerable may be strengthened in relation to the impact of external illicit flows. We define 'resilience' as an acquired capacity amongst people (as individuals or groups) to be able to resist external illicit influences or more effectively manage the costs that these influences may cause (see Zolli and Healy 2013). The process of building resilience targets two interrelated aspects:

- reducing immediate vulnerability; and
- building a future capacity to be resilient.

Activities that focus on both of these objectives include a wide range of work, both with individuals and groups of people and communities. Resilience-building activities provide a host of opportunities and ideas for intervention. They can generally be divided into five broad categories:

- Activities that target particular vulnerable groups by *removing or placing them at a distance* from the dangers associated with some criminal activities or areas of insecurity. School sports or outdoor programmes for young men that draw them away from the influence of gangs constitute one such an example.
- Processes that *draw on the inner resilience of established groups to influence* others who may be drawn into illicit activities. The use of women's or mothers' groups to influence the behaviour of men or boys is an example. One caution needs to be observed, however, in assuming that 'traditional' leaders will have the capacity to engage with youth, as significant generation gaps have been observed.
- Interventions that *bolster the intervention capacities of communities* themselves, such as in the case of stand-by negotiators, 'peace monitors' or other forms of community responses to violence and security.
- Investments in *employment creation and training to divert* vulnerable groups from insecure areas or illicit activities. Large-scale work and/or vocational training would fit this category, but the emphasis should be on the creation of employment that allows for social advancement, rather than just menial labour.

- Initiatives that seek to expose, *'name and shame'* those engaged in illicit activities in communities. Such approaches are seldom possible without wider law enforcement and community support and must provide a pathway for the reintegration of groups or individuals into the community.

Resilience programmes work best when conducted across several of these categories at once, reinforcing the overall objective in multiple ways.

Kingston: building resilience to face the future

The 2010 operation in Tivoli Gardens by the security forces to apprehend Christopher 'Dudus' Coke was a very frightening experience for citizens who live in West Kingston. The Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP) played an instrumental role in the healing process by organising emergency counselling sessions and therapeutic trips for many of these traumatised residents. One individual who benefited from these services noted that '... I lost my cousin in the happenings last month and I was so upset with the police and just about everybody but, after coming out and talking to psychiatrists and other persons, I realised that being upset does not help and these trips have helped me to de-stress a whole lot.' The programme is also playing an active role in helping to empower citizens in inner-city communities so that they become less dependent on criminals. In doing so, the CSJP is helping to reintroduce the presence of the state in order to improve citizens' socio-economic conditions and prevent criminal domination (see Marston 2015).

Government agencies and institutions are poorly placed to develop sustainable strategies of resilience for communities. Religious groups and organisations, social and local groups, and extended family and ethnic associations provide much more viable opportunities for doing so. The use of such interlocutors carries some risks given that few such organisations are completely neutral in the highly politicised environments that often characterise insecure cities.

Manila: focusing on safety is a form of resilience

The Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD) is a widely respected civil society body that organises informal settler communities into housing cooperatives. IPD does not purchase or donate land to informal settlers, but rather works within existing government programmes. IPD recognises that few informal settlers use government housing programmes because of a lack of trust in the government, lack of money to purchase land and housing, and poor programme design. To counter these challenges, IPD coordinates these housing cooperatives to renegotiate loan agreements that are more favourable to the cooperative. Standard loan agreements offered by the Social Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC) are between individual families and the SHFC, do not allow economic activities on the property, and require a multitude of corrupt payments. The revised agreements are between the housing cooperative and the SHFC, allow economic activities on the property, and try to limit corrupt payments.

The first revision creates an agreement between the housing cooperative and the SHFC, and in doing so creates a middleman and level of protection for the family in the form of the cooperative. Working as a cooperative gives greater power to families than negotiating with the SHFC individually. Additionally, payments and other legalities are now the responsibility of the cooperative and not individual families. The second revision allows for economic activities within the cooperative. The third revision requires all documents and regulations for land purchase, building permits, zoning and others, to be presented together at the beginning of any loan, contract, or project. Currently, regulations are presented in a series. In other words, one regulation is shown, and when it is met the next is divulged. This allows government officials to demand multiple bribes or unauthorised facilitation payments to move the project forward. To counter these corrupt practices, the cooperatives are requesting transparency within the programme(s) by having everything presented in advance. Unfortunately, however, with the IPD project connected to a government programme it has not taken into account that informal settlers cannot afford to pay cash for their homes, and it does not address the issue of the surrounding environment of increased crime, corruption and vulnerability. IDP is trying to renegotiate government programmes to benefit informal settlers. However, the issues of jobs, lack of money to make loan payments, and the surrounding environment that often pulls an individual or family down into crime, need to be addressed (see Guth 2015).

These and other principles could be contained in a code of conduct for resilience-building partners.

What criteria might be applied to people or groups who partner with (or are funded by) cities to engage in resilience building activities? Five emerged from our city studies:

- They must contain credible leadership.
- They must not themselves have been involved in illicit activities, although some exceptions should be considered in specific case, such as in using reformed gang members.
- They should not carry a specific political character, although again there are possible exceptions to this where political organisations have great legitimacy in local or city-wide communities.
- They should explicitly exclude the use of violence and be focused on the peaceful resolution of disputes through engagement and negotiation.
- They should not be set up explicitly in direct competition with criminal or violent extremist groups.

It should be emphasised that resilience-building activities take time. They are likely to be much more effective if conducted in conjunction with those aimed at regulation, communication and enforcement. Resilience-building activities are vulnerable to subversion by illicit actors, precisely because they may often target community support for individuals, and so will seldom succeed on their own.

The final word: inclusion

In the longer term securing cities in a globalising world will require every effort to be made in the light of the requirement to ensure inclusion, particularly of the most marginalised and excluded. Ironically it is these people, generally seen to be disconnected from the benefits of the global economy, who are most likely to be linked to its dystopian side. No amount of enforcement alone will succeed in achieving their inclusion into the mainstream of city life, and law-enforcement interventions may in fact serve to exclude them.

Integrating 'security bubbles'

A 'security bubble' can be defined as a place within a city that has the resources and influence to insulate itself from the wider city with the objective of achieving greater levels of security. The term 'security' is used here deliberately, as the focus is on physical security, not wider integration or on achieving long-term safety. Security bubbles in our ten cities often have low levels of crime in comparison to those parts of the city inhabited by the poor and most marginalised. Achieving security in relatively well-demarcated spaces in the city with the appropriate resources is not hard to achieve: fences, armed guards and electronic monitoring make an effective security combination for localised spaces. This may even be important, at least in the short term, as it provides space for the growth of middle-class societies and productive activities. Yet, in the medium term, 'security bubbles' become guarded and inaccessible zones which prevent cities from achieving their full potential. The express objective of safety governance must be an integration of security bubbles within the wider city community, building longer-term social compacts around safety (see Hentschel 2015).

Our analysis has illustrated how rapidly cities are growing. The core challenge for cities in a globalising world is to ensure through spatial planning, housing, the provision of services and a constant process of engagement that all citizens of the city are drawn as far as possible into its benefits. The argument that such policies will simply attract more people to already crowded cities is not sustainable: people will come anyway, and it is far better to build a safer community in which to receive newcomers by fostering a dynamic that focuses on peaceful coexistence in an environment where opportunities are available for even the most marginalised and excluded. The use of the framework of 'safety governance' that explicitly sees safety as the outcome of multiple inputs – in the areas of regulation, enforcement, engagement and resilience, all with the objective of building bridges between communities – provides an overarching strategic direction for city government.

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ANNEXURE B

Important Literature

Date	Author(s)	Title	Access
1955–2015	UNODC	UN Congresses on crime prevention and criminal justice, 1955–2015	http://www.un.org/en/events/crimecongress2015/pdf/60_years_booklet_EN.pdf
1994	ECOSOC	Technical cooperation in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice	http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1994/eres1994-22.htm
1995	UN Security Council	Guidelines for the prevention of urban crime	http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1995/eres1995-9.htm
1997	ECOSOC	Elements of responsible crime prevention: Standards and norms	http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1997/eres1997-33.htm
2001	ECOSOC	Action to promote effective community-based crime prevention	http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2001/resolution%202001-11.pdf
2001	UN Habitat	Cities in a globalizing world: global report on human settlements	http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/Cities_in_a_globalizing_world_2001.pdf
2002	ECOSOC	Action to promote effective crime prevention	http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2002/resolution%202002-13.pdf
2003	UN Stats	Social indicators in the urban context: urban poverty and health study in sub-Saharan Africa	http://unstats.un.org/UNSD/demographic/meetings/egm/Socialstat_0503/docs/no_35.pdf
2003	ECOSOC	Prevention of urban crime	http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2003/resolution%202003-26.pdf
2003	UN ESA	Manual for the development of a system of criminal justice statistics	http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesF/SeriesF_89e.pdf
2004	ECOSOC	Prevention of urban crime	http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2004/resolution%202004-31.pdf

2004	ECOSOC	An integrated approach to rural development dialogues at the Economic and Social Council	http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/pdfs/an_integrated_approach_to_rural_development.pdf
2005	UN	African common position on crime prevention and criminal justice	http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/cap_crimeprevention_2005.pdf
2005	ECOSOC	World youth report, 2005	http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/wyr05
2006	ECOSOC	UN standards and norms in crime prevention	http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2006/resolution%202006-20.pdf
2006	UN Habitat	State of the world's cities, 2006/7	https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/11292101_alt.pdf
2006	UNODC	Compendium of UN standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice	http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ATTPrepCom/Background%20documents/CompendiumofUnstandardsandnormsincrimeprevention.pdf
2008	ECOSOC	Strengthening prevention of urban crime: an integrated approach	http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2008/resolution%202008-24.pdf
2008	ECOSOC	Preparations for the 12th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Recommendations	http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2008/resolution%202008-22.pdf
2010	UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Social Justice	Documents and reports generated by Congress	http://www.un.org/en/conf/crimecongress2010/documents.shtml
2010	UN Habitat	State of the world's cities, 2010-11	https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/11143016_alt.pdf
2011	UN Youth Year	Fact sheet on juvenile justice	http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/wyr11/FactSheetonYouthandJuvenileJustice.pdf
2012	UN Habitat	State of the world's cities, 2012/13	https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/745habitat.pdf
2013	UN Habitat	Revised compilation for sustainable cities and human settlements	https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2913Revised%20Cities%20SDG%20Compilation%2020%20Dec%202013.pdf
2014	UNDP	Human development report for Latin	http://ba.one.un.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/huma

		America, 2013–2014	n-development-report-for-latin-america-2013-2014/
2014	UN Habitat	Rural electrification and security: two case studies	https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5585Rural%20Electrification%20and%20Security.pdf
2015	UN Habitat	Sustainable cities and human settlements in the post-2015 UN development agenda	https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1653SustainableCities.pdf

Important Tools

Date	Author(s)	Title	Access
2015	UN Habitat	UN Habitat urban data	http://urbandata.unhabitat.org
2015	UN	Dag Digital Library	http://repository.un.org
2015	UN	UN Statistics	http://unstats.un.org
2015	UN	UN Data	http://data.un.org/Default.aspx
2015	UN	UN Publications	https://unp.un.org
2015	UN	Official Documents System Search	http://www.un.org/en/documents/ods/
2015	UN	UN Treat Collection	https://treaties.un.org/Pages/FileSearch.aspx?tab=SEARCH
2015	UN	UN Yearbook	http://unyearbook.un.org
2015	UNODC	UNODC Data	https://data.unodc.org
2015	UNODC	UNODC Criminal Justice Toolkit	https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/justice-and-prison-reform/Criminal-Justice-Toolkit.html
2015	UNODC	UNODC Training Manual on Policing Urban Spaces	http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/crimeprevention/Training_Manual_Policing_Urban_Space_V

			1258164.pdf
2015	UNODC	UNODC Introductory Handbook on Policing Urban Spaces	https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Introductory_Handbook_on_Policing_Urban_Space.pdf
2015	UNODC	UNODC Handbook on Crime Prevention Guidelines	https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_Crime_Prevention_Guidelines_-_Making_them_work.pdf
2015	UNODC	UNODC Handbook on Planning and Action for Crime Prevention in Southern Africa and the Caribbean	https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_Planning_and_Action_for_Crime_Prevention_in_Southern_Africa_and_the_Caribbean_pdf.pdf
2015	UNODC	UNODC Practical Approaches to Urban Crime Prevention	https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Practical_Approaches_to_Urban_Crime_Prevention.pdf
2015	UNICRI	UN Bibliography on Organised Crime and Corruption	http://www.unicri.it/services/library_documentation/bibliographies/organized_crime_corruption/organized_crime_database.php
2015	UNICRI	UN World Criminological Directory	http://www.unicri.it/services/library_documentation/criminological_directory/world_directory.php