

# Evaluation of the DEC funded CAFOD interventions in Haiti Phase 1 and Phase 2

## “Haiti Earthquake Response”

**Project:** Haiti Earthquake Response, Phases 1, 2.1 & 2.2.

**Funding provided through:** the UK Disaster Emergency Committee

**Projects implemented through:** Catholic Relief Services (USA) and  
Caritas Switzerland

**Project period:** 24 months - February 2010 to January 2012

**Evaluation period:** January 2012

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A new CRS urban double vault latrine in Solino, shared among 3 families.



A Caritas Switzerland 3 room earthquake and hurricane resistant house. The solar panel is only on this house for demonstration purposes, but all houses are wired for electricity.

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I apologise in advance for any errors or mis-representations and false wisdom as it is always easier to discern the obvious in hindsight.

## Abbreviations and Acronyms and Map

CaCH	Caritas Switzerland
CfW	Cash For Work (\$50 per rotation of 10 work days)
CRRP	Community Resettlement and Recovery Program (CRS urban project)
CRS	Catholic Relief Services (USA)
DRR/CCA	Disaster Risk Reduction/Climate Change Adaptation
EQ	Earthquake
FGD	Focus Group discussion
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HH	HouseHold
HHP	Head of Humanitarian Programmes (CAFOD staff)
IDP	Internally Displaced Person(s)
ITECA	Institut de Technologie et d'Animation
KII	Key Informant Interview
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
NFI	Non Food Items
PaP	Port-au-Prince
VIP latrine	Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (in this context also includes solid waste management)



Map of Haiti with the yellow arrows indicating the areas where CAFOD's partners are intervening with DEC funding

CRS in urban Port au Prince

Caritas Switzerland in rural Gressier

## **1. Executive summary and main recommendations**

### ***Context***

Following the earthquake of January 2010, the emergency response in Haiti has been particularly difficult due to the intensity of the disaster in a largely over-populated urban setting and in a long term environmentally, educationally, economically and governance impoverished nation and which also directly affected those responsible for the response.

CAFOD traditionally prefers to work through partners and tries to avoid direct implementation. In Haiti it was able to quickly connect and contract with two former international partners from the Caritas agencies: CRS for direct implementation of WASH activities and Caritas Switzerland (CaCH) for permanent rural house reconstruction in rural Gressier with direct co-implementation with a local agency, ITECA. Both CRS and CaCH also had other large contributions from other donors for the same activities.

Phase 1, which ran for 6 months between February and July 2010 went only through CRS and provided critical WASH relief services to about 50,000 people in 12 camps. This involved providing water (water trucking), constructing and maintaining 227 public pit latrines, renting and maintaining 437 portable latrines, constructing and maintaining 27 hand washing stations, providing solid waste collection and removal, providing 12,419 hygiene kits and 35,705 mosquito nets, digging and maintaining 4,300m of drainage canals and conducting activities and training in hygiene promotion. In cooperation with Trócaire, CRS also provided 5 Child Friendly Spaces with accompanying educational and recreational activities. The effort cost £942,776 from the DEC and £1,074,016 from Trócaire and other CAFOD sources and represented 62% of CRS WASH expenditure for the period.

Phase 2 (2.1 and 2.2) ran for 18 months between August 2010 and January 2012 through both CRS for the continuation of WASH activities and CaCH for the implementation of a 100 house pilot project in rural communities. WASH activities effectively transitioned from 12 camps to 5 urban neighbourhoods (CRRPs) between January and July 2011. The CRS CRRP effort in integrated development is due to last at least until October 2014 and the DEC-CAFOD support to WASH activities only represents 35% of CRS WASH expenditures during this period. House reconstruction started in August 2010 with the construction of 4 prototypes but due to logistical delays and institutional factors the actual construction of the 100 houses started in March 2011 and was nearly finished in February 2012. The effort cost £2,535,450 from the DEC with £1,535,440 for CRS and £1,000,000 for CaCH.

The evaluation lasted one month and is based on the information acquired from project documentation gathered from the 4 agencies, 33 sampled WASH beneficiaries in 2 CRS urban neighbourhoods (CRRPs), 4 WASH beneficiary focus group discussions, 2 WASH Committee members focus group discussions, 2 house beneficiary focus group discussions, 1 house builders focus group discussion, KII with 6 CAFOD staff from the London office and 8 Haiti partner staff in Haiti, 6 visits for direct observation in the field of 2 WASH neighbourhoods, 2 ex-WASH camps and 2 Shelter villages.

### ***Findings***

#### **CAFOD**

The general conclusion is that CAFOD made a good decision not to become operational in Haiti and to work through international Caritas agencies committed to Haiti in the two critical areas of WASH and Shelter. The two projects have been successful, both in Phase 1 in WASH and in Phase 2 both in WASH and Shelter in reaching some of the neediest Haitians and with a solid impact beyond the emergency response. CAFOD was a full partner with regard to CRS in WASH as it approached and worked with CRS-Haiti directly, but it maintained a donor-grantee relationship throughout with regards to CaCH as it was approached by and only worked with CaCH-Lucerne and did not become directly involved in any way with CaCH in Haiti and its local partner ITECA. While there is no certainty that, had CAFOD exhibited a fuller extent of partnership with

CaCH-Haiti and ITECA the major outcomes of the delays such as cost overruns and a difficult relationship with ITECA would have been different, at least it would have exercised due diligence as a Caritas partner and be truer to its partnership commitment as stated in its Ways of Working, CAFOD Accountability Framework and its Haiti Country Strategy).

The partnership CAFOD-CRS was the best solution in this case for Haiti and produced good results, both in Phase 1 and 2, as CRS made an early commitment to WASH with rapid scaling up partly because CAFOD kept closely involved and offered skills and staff support. As a result of this active partnership, CRS is now stronger both in emergency WASH implementation and in accountability. The relationship CAFOD-CaCH seemed a good solution combining CaCH's credibility in house construction and ITECA's credibility in community development and produced acceptable results but the combination also incurred significant delays, cost overruns and discontentment between CaCH and its Haitian partner ITECA.

CAFOD had little documentation regarding either project other than what was strictly required by the DEC. There were no monthly reports (internal or from partners), no detailed project description with maps and only a few staff trip reports to Haiti. Most of the information was held in the Head of Humanitarian Programmes memory and work emails. There is a central repository only of DEC contractual documents.

### **CRS - WASH**

CRS performed well essential WASH services in the camps after a steep learning curve (and with assistance from CAFOD) and has started a longer term integrated process for difficult urban WASH activities with good initial results but with an unbalanced focus on quantity rather than quality, including beneficiary participation and empowerment and social processes as part of the objectives and indicators. Beneficiary satisfaction has been high both in camps and in the CRRPs. However, CRS still does not have an internal WASH emergency capacity nor a WASH emergency strategy/policy and will likely struggle again in the next emergency.

Phase 1 (WASH in the camps) lasted 6 months in the initial primary emergency and could not be evaluated in depth nearly 18 months later as beneficiaries do not have the perception of distinct project phases and much the same WASH activities continued into Phase 2 until about March 2011, except for the NFI distributions and the small protection activities. It can be ascertained from beneficiaries and staff comments that the WASH response in the camps until March 2011 was largely successful considering the constraints early on: new WASH (and other) team, slow internal CRS procedures and lack of space for WASH infrastructure. The transition to WASH in the CRRPs was delayed by up to three months primarily by the cholera epidemic due to the need for continuous Hygiene Promotion, rigorous water and sanitation management and the CRS emphasis on a massive shelter construction campaign as a way into the CRRPs.

Thanks to CAFOD's active support, CRS in Haiti is now a model of good practice for beneficiary accountability due to management commitment and dedicated staff. Overtime, it has also significantly improved several systems such as M&E, procurement and logistics. The latrines built by local masons seem well targeted, very appreciated, well used and shared with a few quality issues (see photos in Annex 3). These are acknowledged by CRS WASH management and are in the process of being acted upon. Hygiene Promotion is well implemented with general door to door and group activities, including children and in schools and evolving into more self-maintaining community activities. The two weaknesses noted were more to do with Quality management: a lack of specific attention to at-risk families and a lack of on-going monitoring for improving the impact and sustainability of HP activities. The waste management activities are a particular success, due partly to CRS's additional effort to link with the services of private companies for refuse removal. Beneficiaries express a great appreciation for the gutters and water tanks attached to the CRS shelters. The DEC funded water filters (about 800) are still in use but not for drinking water. These were of a poor design where there is a high risk of re-contamination of the clean water through

manual handling of the filter outlet (see photos in Annex 3). CRS is now testing other water filters both for beneficiary acceptance and technical performance.

Some of the institutional weaknesses noted include the difficulty in getting up-to-date disaggregated project information and an M&E system short on total quality monitoring (technical and social).

### **CaCH - Shelter**

The DEC activities partially achieved their initial purpose, perhaps estimated at 70% overall: 69 houses are DEC funded (against 100 planned) and 70% (estimated and to be verified) of well targeted beneficiaries. While the technical results of the 100 house pilot phase are excellent but with significant cost overruns and delays, the pilot project CAFOD-CaCH-ITECA suffered from institutional issues which prevent current agreements to continue past the pilot phase as both the CAFOD-CaCH and the CaCH-ITECA partnerships are dissolved at the conclusion of the pilot phase. However, CaCH had high praise for ITECA during the immediate relief phase (primarily for distributions). At the time of the evaluation, the beneficiaries had only been given the keys to the houses the day before and had not yet been living in the houses. There remained some rain water harvesting systems and latrines to be completed.

The 36m<sup>2</sup> houses ended up costing \$12,500 each (as against \$6,300 initially), partly due to added features such as a third room, the rain water harvesting system and a VIP latrine but also due to a more expensive than technically necessary roof (+\$900), non-preventable additional transport costs (+\$1,000) and high labour costs (\$3,000). The houses are at the top end of similar reconstruction projects both for construction quality and for amenities. The builders were well trained and closely followed-up by both ITECA and CaCH engineers with on-going concrete lab-testing and step-by-step quality control. The beneficiaries were satisfied with the relationships with the builders, technicians and engineers but expressed a level of dissatisfaction with the beneficiary selection process. In 5 of the 10 zones, the houses were predominantly assigned to members of a very few extended families (2-3 families) rather than spread out to more families (4-8).

The investment costs for house design and construction and project set-up continue to bear fruit as ITECA and possibly Trócaire continue to build similar houses.

There were transparency issues between the stakeholders, for example CaCH-Haiti knew of CAFOD's funding but not that it was the major funder as its proportion kept changing and CaCH-Haiti did not know about CAFOD's other Haiti commitments until early 2011. ITECA was never informed of CAFOD's involvement in the project, though it was the primary contributor and a former CAFOD project partner, and was only made aware of it through its own informal channels.

### **ITECA - Shelter**

ITECA had not been a CAFOD partner for more than ten years and although it has much experience in long term community development but it did not have the experience of a large emergency construction project with its high level of contractual and management demands and this caused some problems particularly as the project was managed primarily by the Executive Director with little delegation.

The less than optimum results from the CAFOD-CaCH-ITECA partnership are attributed to 5 key factors:

1) The very long chain of information and authority which led to a lack of transparency and poor communications all around:

. 1 CAFOD London - 2 CaCH Lucerne - 3 CaCH Haiti - 4 ITECA - 5 beneficiaries

where as in most other cases it is more direct:

. 1 CAFOD London - 2 NGO in-country - 3 beneficiaries (such as with the CRS partnership)

2) CAFOD contracted CaCH as a donor rather than as a partner agency (unlike the relationship with CRS in Haiti) while it previously had a partner relationship with ITECA but chose not to reactivate it.

- 3) Intrinsic and significant institutional differences:
  - a) ITECA with more than 30 years of community involvement in Gressier, with political clout, part of a national ideological movement (Mouvement Paysan) and with long term international partners (many Caritas agencies ) but no expertise in permanent housing or large emergency project management and dependent on a strong executive director.
  - b) CaCH-Emergency only arrived in country after the EQ (though CaCH-development, with only 1 staff at the time of the EQ, had been in Haiti 30 years but only involved in small partner projects), starting from scratch but with the support of CaCH-Development to get established, also with many of the same international partners (many Caritas agencies) but with permanent housing and large emergency project management expertise.
- 4) The CaCH contract states that ITECA could feedback on the technical issues, but CaCH could not feedback on the social issues, as these had been delegated as being solely ITECA's remit.
- 5) ITECA did not assign a staff as Project Manager and the project was managed directly by the Executive Director when available.

### ***Lessons Learned (or to be learned)***

#### **General**

In a large emergency, the key resource lacking for up to the end of the first year is technical and project management expertise, both for programmes and support services (procurement and logistics particularly).

With regards to partners, although the DEC contract was signed between CAFOD London and CaCH Lucerne, CAFOD should have been more involved both with CaCH-Haiti and its former partner ITECA for two reasons: 1) to ensure that CAFOD's own policies (on gender, accountability and protection for example) are understood (and if possible respected) by all implementing agencies and 2) to be able to offer support where possible, especially to national partners (and with the inter-institution relationship in this case).

#### **CRS**

As a common admission from many NGOs in similar circumstance, CRS would seek to be less geographically spread, both for in the camps and in the neighborhoods and to prepare the transitioning from camps to neighborhoods within the first month and to implement it as soon as possible. Other lessons include the mainstreaming of accountability and protection at field level from the beginning and to use or set up more accountable beneficiary representative structures than the oft self-selected committees.

#### **CaCH**

The main lessons revolve around the contractual arrangements starting with defining the project in more realistic terms, such as a 100 house pilot project rather than a 1,700 house project and to establish more specific roles and responsibilities in the implementing partner contract to ensure that there are as few grey areas as possible (jointly the partners will.....). This is particularly the case for logistics, procurement when both partners have different but complementary roles to play.

#### **ITECA**

A project of this size and tight timeframe needs a dedicated Project Manager from the beginning and who has no other responsibilities. Leaving the project management solely with the executive director also leads to concentration of power, a lack of operational redundancy and a lack of wider institutional learning.

### ***Recommendations***

In a large emergency response, CARITAS partners (such as CAFOD and CRS) should assist each other either by seconding relevant staff for technical and project management and also to help recruit for international positions through their own networks, especially when a specific foreign language is required, especially to avoid the critical period after the first 2-3 months when the emergency responders leave and the arrival of long term specialist staff a few months later. If an agency or group of sister agencies aspire to be front line emergency responders, they need to have an active roster of experts able to be deployed at short notice.

This roster should be made up of internal staff and external individuals. Similarly, the same agency(ies) should have ready access to basic emergency and plane-deployable equipment and supplies for: water treatment (tablets, filters, etc.), water quality testing, etc....

When having multiple stakeholders/partnerships (direct and indirect), there should be at least one meeting together at the start to establish the relationships (formal and informal), a level of transparency and perform a stakeholder analysis (strengths and weaknesses, joint histories and interests, etc.). Ideally, other regular meetings should be planned throughout the project (perhaps every 3 months during field visits). All partnerships should involve the sharing of evaluations, studies and other documentation relevant to the activities achieved in partnership.

Replicate the successes of the CAFOD-CRS relationship and offer other partners support using CAFOD's internal emergency expertise such as in WASH and Accountability but also others.

During emergencies, there is difficulty in getting up-to-date and synthesised information as often only global essential quantitative indicators are tracked. It could be useful to instigate a system of simple monthly and quarterly standardised reports with both quantitative and qualitative aspects, both at the global and individual zone level (for example for each camp (12), CRRP (5) and each house building zone (10) with a level of disaggregated data (gender, age, vulnerability). This is not only valuable for writing reports but also for institutional memory.

CAFOD should assist its partners (direct and indirect as in this case) to satisfy and to internally mainstream CAFOD's own declared humanitarian policies such as in Accountability and Protection and compliance with Codes of Conduct, Codes of Good Practice, Sphere and others. CAFOD should also attempt to negotiate a more direct information sharing and communication channel with the agency closest to the beneficiaries, besides the contractual layers of management and responsibility, to ensure the best project impact, greater transparency and responsiveness as a true partner. No matter the nature of the contractual relationships, CAFOD is still responsible to its donors for the sub-contracted activities.

With regard to the setting of criteria and their application for beneficiary selection, it is best to also involve the communities and in some cases (health, hygiene) to include families more at-risk, which involve issues of not only of vulnerability but also of location (next to environmental or geographical hazards), attitudes and other less easily defined specificities.

When starting in community development generally, the social component of community engagement is an essential first activity in itself and should not be left solely to technical field staff. It is essential for: more accurate individual and group assessments, reducing dependency, creating trust in communities and with NGOs, enhancing real participation with joint workplans with clear exit strategies and putting accountability and protection first.

Project documentation should include project baselines (including KAP) performed at the beginning of each project and not a few months after activities have started and joint internal-external mini-evaluations at critical project junctures (end or mid-term) for several reasons: a) as a lesson learning exercise, b) to enable adjustments in the current strategy and its implementation (verifying the assumptions and causalities), c) to validate the effort to date and perhaps assist in establishing or revising foundational documents to be shared internally and with partners (this applies to both CRS for WASH and CaCH-ITECA for the pilot project).

Better define "partners" and "partnerships". While trust is an essential element of partnership it should not be at the cost of accountability and insuring good practice all around. Does a contract between CAFOD and a partner negate the other aspects of partnership, such as support with understanding of (if not with compliance with) CAFOD's social policies and a right of oversight over the key elements of actual project impact, regardless of the contractual arrangements? For example, when an indirectly contracted national civil society agency (and in this case a former CAFOD partner) does not have the experience of a large emergency project with its high level of contractual and management obligations, should CAFOD offer it some support?



## 2. Description of context, project and interventions

### 1. *Haiti in early 2012*

- a. Two years after the anniversary of the earthquake, there is almost no rubble left in the streets, a lot less rubble visible generally, traffic flows better (this is only relative to the first six months!), some public spaces are now devoid of IDPs and the urban landscape is a mix of makeshift habitat, a multitude of transitional shelters and a few efforts in small scale permanent reconstruction.
- b. Haiti was already the poorest country in the Americas and the earthquake damage is estimated to have cost between 100 and 110 % of the annual GDP, the highest ever of any worldwide national disaster, ([Inter-American Development Bank](#)), presenting the challenge that peoples' foremost preoccupation is with safety/security, shelter, food/water, health and work/money (Maslow Hierarchy of Needs) and generally have critical immediate needs which make it difficult to hold a longer term outlook.
- c. Haiti happens to lay on two roughly East-West tectonic fault lines, one along the north coast (Cap Haitien) and one along the southern coast of the Gonave Gulf (Léogâne, Port au Prince). Neither of these faults have moved significantly in more than a hundred years and the 2010 earthquake did not relieve much of the tectonic stresses. The USGS thus warns that there is a high risk of a yet larger earthquake in next few years though it cannot be predicted ([USGS](#)).
- d. High NGO dependency. Between years of ineffective government and frequent natural and man-made disasters (hurricanes, cholera epidemic, deforestation), NGOs have attempted within their limited capacities to assist the suffering communities. But the challenge is that populations who feel abandoned by government structures expect most of their problems to be solved by NGOs as they are more present in the field to deliver products and services. This includes health and education, income generation (micro-credit, cash for work), infrastructure and more recently housing solutions among many other aspects. This leads to a 'love-hate' relationship with NGOs and the difficulty of eliciting honest feedback from beneficiaries who are afraid to do so for fear of losing any real or imaginary entitlement. People often misunderstand an assessment or study for a commitment to deliver products or services.
- e. The hundreds of 'camps', especially in the Port-au-Prince area will exist for many years to come for at least four simple reasons: 1) even before the EQ there were already about 200,000 people living 'in the streets', 2) the anaemic reconstruction effort rebuilds mostly on one level, instead of the previous 2 or 3 storey buildings, 3) most of the emergency funding is focused on the Port-au-Prince area, so that even more people are moving into PAP from the regions (and often move into recently vacated makeshift shelters), 4) land ownership and its administration have been very problematic and many records were lost in the earthquake.
- f. The size of the earthquake disaster and its response means that there is high competition for the same resources from response actors. As Haiti is a small, poor and deforested country, the pool of available resources for the large shelter and housing activities, whether qualified technicians or construction materials, is limited and stretched. The few entrenched national suppliers have little inducement to reduce prices or provide better service though there has been some improvement over time.

## **2. CAFOD and its partners in Haiti before and after the earthquake**

Although the programme had been considerably scaled down in the years up to the earthquake CAFOD has been involved with Haitian partners for more than 20 years, including Caritas Haiti and ITECA. Both these and other former Haitian partners were seriously affected by the earthquake (buildings destroyed, staff and relatives killed, etc.) and were unable to assist with a large scale response in the first few months. Early on CAFOD decided not to become operational and to work through international Caritas partners already present in country. CAFOD had previously worked through CRS and CaCH in other parts of the world, most recently in 2004 in Banda Aceh. CAFOD employed a Haiti Programme Officer in April 2010 to primarily work with CAFOD's other Haitian partners while the Head of Humanitarian Programmes (HHP) remained responsible for the management of the DEC contract and activities through CRS and CaCH.

CAFOD supported ITECA principally in the mid to late eighties with funding for training programmes with peasant women, as part of a programme funded jointly by a number of Catholic Development Agencies (CIDSE). CAFOD also supported ITECA's work via the Catholic Institute for International Relations (now called Progressio) which placed technical volunteers with ITECA. During the years of the military government (1992-95) CAFOD supported ITECA indirectly via an emergency fund for support to victims of repression which was run by the justice and Peace Commission and the Haitian Religious Conference.

Both CRS and CaCH had both been working in Haiti for many years before the earthquake, but very differently. CRS was both directly implementing programmes and projects in rural areas (such as a USAID Multi-Year Assistance Programme - MYAP) and also assisting local Catholic agencies. CaCH only had a very small office dedicated to supporting work through local partners and only had had a small amount of contact with ITECA.

Since the EQ, CRS has been implementing \$90 million of projects in 2010 and 2011 in and around PaP with up to 900 staff and with about 50 funding sources. CaCH started a separate Emergency office in Haiti to work on the Gressier house project for the first year and to implement with ITECA a 100 house pilot project at a final unit cost of \$12,500 and is now directly implementing another permanent house reconstruction project in a peri-urban area of Léogane (220 houses at a unit cost of about \$8,000).

ITECA, a Haitian NGO, has been working in 6 rural communes of Haiti, 5 in Artibonite and 1 in Gressier for 33 years. It is part of an ideological and quasi-political movement, the *Mouvement Paysan*. Their headquarters in PaP collapsed and they moved the headquarters to their training facility in Gressier. Their board of directors include two former prime ministers.


CAFOD approached CRS in January 2010 to offer assistance and quickly agreed on WASH. In March 2011, CAFOD signed a second contract (retroactive to August 1<sup>st</sup>, 2010) with CRS-Haiti to support their own direct implementation of WASH activities for Phase 2.1. On January 13<sup>th</sup> 2012, a final contract was signed for Phase 2.2 (retroactive to 12<sup>th</sup> July 2011). In all cases, projects were cost sharing with DEC funding. The institutional link was directly between CAFOD's Head of Humanitarian Programming and CRS's Deputy Country Representative - Programming and several CAFOD staff visited CRS in Haiti several times starting in January 2010. Three visits were technical in nature by one of CAFOD's Senior Emergency Response Officer as a WASH and Accountability specialist and some were conducted by the Head of Humanitarian Programmes for project management (donor reports, budget adjustments, etc.). The original activities were all camp based and CAFOD supported CRS's decision to transition out of the camps and into urban neighbourhoods (CRRPs). At the time of the DEC/CAFOD funding, CRS was also involved in the construction of 10,000 T-shelters in the CRRP zones and its overall WASH funding represented only about 5% of its Haiti budget. CAFOD concurrently assisted CRS for other activities from other funding. CRS's WASH program was most effective between October 2010 and March 2011 when it had a full complement of technical and management staff. It then had a 6 month period of wavering when it transitioned to the

CRRPs with a different strategy and different staff structure, more decentralised with separate lines of management and information/advice, with more dotted lines and which took time to adjust to.

After being approached by CaCH Lucerne, CAFOD signed a contract with CaCH in Lucerne on December 8, 2010 (but retroactive to 1<sup>st</sup> September 2010) to spearhead their Haiti emergency operations in permanent reconstruction using a 100 house pilot project. Throughout the duration of the contract CAFOD's HHP visited CaCH-Haiti 4 times for project management functions and did not maintain a direct contact with the CaCH Emergency Director in Haiti. CaCH Lucerne then signed a contract with ITECA as the co-implementing partner in Gressier, largely responsible for all the project's social aspects and community activities. CaCH was responsible for the overall project management (including financial oversight), the overall technical and quality management and the logistics to the warehouse in front of ITECA's office in Gressier. CaCH was also involved in raising other funding to contribute to the 100 house pilot project while ITECA also raised funds toward the greater 1,700 houses reconstruction effort in Gressier.

Mapping CAFOD and its Haiti Partner Network for DEC activities:

- CAFOD, CaCH and ITECA have access to some of the same CI partners and have various contracts with them.
- CAFOD funds CRS with DEC funding only between February 2010 and January 2012 (Phases 1 and 2).
- Trocaire co-funds only during Phase 1 and CAFOD will support CRS with its own funds in Phase 3.
- CAFOD also funds CRS from other CAFOD funding sources for other activities.
- CRS also gets other funding for all its WASH activities.
- CAFOD funds CaCH with DEC funding only for DEC Phase 2 (August 2010 to January 2012. CAFOD was part of a larger and longer term multiple funding partnership but due to donor time constraints, it ended up funding 69% of the pilot project and none afterwards.
- CaCH also gets other funding for its 100 house pilot project in Gressier.



Map of the locations of the 5 CRRPs in Port au Prince, Solino in the upper left and Nerette in the lower right

### 3. The DEC funded projects

#### Phase 1 (February – July 2010)

GOAL: People affected by the earthquake are enabled to meet immediate needs whilst they rebuild their lives.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: People living in camps as a result of displacement by the earthquake, in particular children, have a healthy and safe environment.

In this response, Trócaire contributed 25% of the overall budget from its own appeal funds, CAFOD contributed 25% from its own supporter income and 50% came from CAFOD's DEC allocation and all activities were implemented by CRS.

DEC contribution is £942,776 and about 50% of the overall effort.

Summary table taken from the DEC reports:

Item	Beneficiaries	Comment
1. Provide Sphere levels of water to 50,000 people in IDP camps and critical institutions	36,096 people in 11 camps receiving full WASH services	No detailed information was provided.
2. Provide latrines to the local WASH cluster agreed level of 100 people latrine, or better. With 1 hand wash station per latrine block.	29,446 people have access to 227 pit latrines.	. Due to lack of space in camps, 82% of the population are receiving coverage at the rate of 130 people per latrine. . 21,500 people in one camp (Champs de Mars) and three institutions have access to 437 portable latrines at the rate of 50 people per every one portable latrine. . 27 hand washing stations have been constructed, providing 71% coverage for hand washing services to existing latrine blocks. Challenges in material procurement resulted in delayed provision of hand washing stations.
3. Provide solid waste refuse collection services to Sphere standards in 10 IDP camps	9 camps and 2 in planning	CRS is collaborating with SMCRS and other private companies to provide waste collection services in 9 camps once a week.
4. Provide hygiene NFIs to 10,000 families	12,419 individuals have received hygiene kits.	
5. Children regularly access services at child-friendly spaces in the camps.	5 child-friendly spaces (CFS) were established in three IDP camps and on average 1,213 registered children visited the CFS' at least 3 times a week.	This activity was led by Trócaire under a Protection mandate. This was a seven-month project. The first month focused on setting up the Child-Friendly Spaces (CFS) at five sites, and active programming took place for 6 months (720 educational and recreational activities were completed weekly in all 5 CFS' allowing for children to play, socialize, learn and express themselves as they rebuild their lives. 100% of the children visiting the CFS' are monitored daily for signs of trauma or distress by trained community animators – 44 children have been referred to a trained psychologists and have received psycho-social support.

## Phase 2 (August 2010 – January 2012)

No Goal(s) or Strategic objectives have been mentioned for Phase 2, even though it is radically different from Phase 1 and now includes Shelter (permanent houses) in addition to WASH in camps and CRRPs.

DEC contribution is £2,535,450. CRS: £1,535,440 and CaCH: £1,000,000.

Summary table taken from the DEC reports:

Item	Beneficiaries	Comment
a) Provide Sphere Level Water to 50,000 People. <i>Revised to 27,916 people in Phase 2 Report 1 due to the transition from camps to neighborhoods.</i>	27,516 people	Between August 2010 and December 2010 the programme focus was on delivery of water to communities in camps. During this time 27,516 people, 79% of the target population, received seven litres of water per person per day, which was supplemented with water from private vendors and government water networks, providing access to 14 litres of water per person per day, which is 93% of the target 15 litres recommended in Sphere guidelines.  From January 2011 to July 2011, CAFOD's partners CRS began the transition from provision of water in camps to neighbourhoods.  802 water filters were distributed in Terrain Toto camp (where beneficiaries are semi-permanently settled into CRS T-shelters)  4,200 rain water harvesting systems were installed on CRS T-shelters.
b) Provides latrines to the local WASH cluster agreed level of 100 people/latrine or better, and one hand wash station per latrine block <i>This standard was revised down to 50 persons per latrine in June 2010.</i>	26,380 people in camps with access to sanitation facilities.  506 latrines in camps and 43 showers.  766 latrines in CRRPs	In addition to latrine provision, CAFOD ensured latrines in camps were maintained, providing routine desludging of a total of 79 latrine pits and 415 portable latrines which were disinfected on a daily basis until June 2011, whereupon the responsibility has been passed to communities and/or local NGO partners
c) Provide solid waste refuse collection services to Sphere standards to target populations	37,596 families	727 clean-up campaigns were conducted in all neighborhoods supported in this project and 2,957 people participated in the clean-up campaigns.  3,885 m <sup>3</sup> of solid waste removed.
d) Provide hygiene NFIs to 10,000 families	10,000 families living in twelve camps and 6,500 families living in communities received soap and aqua tabs.	In December 2010, CRS began hygiene promotion in camps to increase the effectiveness of aqua tabs and soap use.  4,000 hygiene sessions per month benefitting 8,500 individuals. From January to March 2011, the emphasis was put on cholera prevention for camp populations for an average of 3,000 people each month.  Neighbourhoods were targeted with thirteen hygiene campaigns providing information on cholera prevention and other diarrhoeal diseases, reaching a total of 7,371 people, an average of a little over 1,000 people per month.
e) Community members, with a focus on vulnerable groups, have increased their	36,512 individuals	Awareness raising activities, including community events and educational materials, also indirectly benefiting an estimated 30,000 people, giving a total of 66,512 individuals in camps and communities.  Over the life of the project, fifty community based organizations camps and neighborhoods were selected and staff were trained in norms and

knowledge on protection issues and services available.		standards of Protection in order to respond to needs of the communities in seven camps, raising community awareness and ability to respond to protection issues. Topics covered included gender based violence, protecting vulnerable community members, human rights advocacy, first aid training, and organizational strengthening in addressing community needs.
f) CRS gains a better understanding of best practices as it relates to Protection and WASH interventions in emergency settings, and incorporates lessons learned into ongoing WASH and Protection programming in Haiti and other emergencies.	The 60-person CRS WASH team	Training on protection concerns for water and sanitation interventions, and supported to uphold Sphere and other protection standards in their installations.  Protection animators/mobilizers then worked alongside the WASH team to ensure that the beneficiary needs were met and that any protection risks mitigated as much as possible. Protection staff provided input to WASH engineer on location and appropriateness of latrine facilities.
g) 100 earthquake and hurricane resistant houses with toilets and rainwater harvesting structures are reconstructed in the mountainous area of Petit Boucan of Gressier. <i>Revised to 76 houses in Phase 2 Report 1</i>	69 houses for DEC though all 100 houses for the pilot phases have been built.	Not all the houses are finished as of the end of January 2012. There remained a few rainwater harvesting systems and latrines to finish.  Significant changes to the original plan have been made, both in terms of schedule and numbers of houses provided. Delays have been experienced for a number of reasons including logistical challenges and the availability of skilled labourers: the construction of model houses revealed that contrary to plans, beneficiaries did not have the requisite skills for house-building and that there was too little time to train them to the standards required for earthquake and hurricane resistant housing. The number of houses to be constructed has been changed as the estimated bill of quantities for materials used was found to be inaccurate and therefore the cost of construction was greater than anticipated.
h) The knowledge of local masons and construction workers about appropriate earthquake and hurricane resistant building practices for future habitat development is enhanced.		Several training workshops have been conducted, enhancing the knowledge of construction workers in earthquake and hurricane resistant building techniques. These skills are continuously developed during the construction process and on-the-job training is provided through the inclusion of skilled labourers in the building teams. Engineers from both ITECA and CaCH continually supervise and build the capacity of the building teams.
i) Local building material enterprises have been considered and direct employment has been increased.		The regular acquisition of local building material is ongoing and local material suppliers have been considered, resulting in the signing of contracts for cement, steel bars and concrete formwork for all houses. Using the Haitian market to order and purchase materials which conform to the quality standards of CAFOD's partner, Caritas Swiss, has proved challenging, though CAFOD has adhered to its policy favouring local producers wherever possible and using local wholesalers where material is not produced locally.

### **3. Evaluation Methodology**

The evaluation was conducted by an external evaluator with more than 18 months' experience in Post Earthquake Haiti during 8 other missions with 6 other INGOs and selected by the CAFOD office in London. The field work of the evaluation took place during three weeks between the 17<sup>th</sup> January and the 3<sup>rd</sup> February 2012, at the conclusion of the DEC Phase 2 funding for both partners (CRS and CaCH).

The analysis is based on the information acquired from project documentation from CAFOD and partners, 33 sampled WASH beneficiaries in 2 PaP neighbourhoods (CRRPs), 4 WASH beneficiary focus group discussions, 2 WASH Committee members focus group discussions, 2 house beneficiary focus group discussions, 1 house builders focus group discussion, KII with 6 CAFOD staff from the London office and 8 Haiti partner staff in Haiti, 6 visits for direct observation in the field of 2 WASH neighbourhoods, 2 ex-WASH camps and 2 Shelter villages.

All these tools were used jointly to ensure the validity and triangulation of the information collected. See Annex 5 for the evaluation timeline.

The beneficiary survey, key informant interview and focus groups were conducted using standard questionnaires to ensure that everyone answered the same questions (see Annexes 1 & 2).

The consultant employed two experienced Créole speaking Haitian colleagues for translation and beneficiary surveys.

#### **Key activities**

1. The evaluator spent 5 days with beneficiaries in the field in 2 CRRPs, 2 camps and 2 House reconstruction zones.
2. Collecting and analysing project documents.

#### **CAFOD**

3. Key Informant Interviews of 7 CAFOD staff
4. A presentation of findings and recommendations to the senior management in CAFOD in London.

#### **WASH - CRS**

5. CRS Key Informant Interviews (KII) with Senior staff (3), Focus Group Discussions with WASH field staff (2), and 5 less formal discussions with support staff in procurement, logistics, finance, engineering&construction and human resources.
6. Direct Observations in 2 camps (Terrain Toto and Parc Acra) and 2 CRRPs (Nerette and Solino). An attempt was made to visit Champ de Mars but could not be completed due to insecurity.
7. 33 WASH random questionnaires in the 2 CRRPs (5 zones). This was not meant as statistical exercise but more to corroborate the information gathered in the FGDs, especially as the selection of zones and beneficiary was organised by CRS staff.
8. 6 WASH FGD (4 with beneficiaries and 2 with WASH committee members in 2 CRRPs)
9. A presentation of findings and recommendations to the CRS management and WASH team in PaP.

#### **SHELTER – CaCH and ITECA**

10. Key Informant Interviews (KII) with Senior staff (5), CaCH and ITECA.
11. Direct Observations in 2 villages (Ti Ginen and Fonma)
12. 2 FGD with beneficiaries of 2 villages and 1 FGD with builders

13. Informal polling on impact of project of non-beneficiaries in the same 2 villages
14. A presentation of findings and recommendations to the CaCH and ITECA management in PaP (only the ITECA executive director was present to represent ITECA).

### **Constraints**

- 1) In both cases the implementation zones are generally difficult of access and thus the more remote zones are impossible to reach with a limited time frame.
- 2) Between the difficulty of access, the need for staff accompaniment, the lack of information about the beneficiary zones (not held by CAFOD, partially provided with difficulty from CRS and reasonably provided by CaCH/ITECA) and the need to warn the beneficiaries of our activities, both CRS and CaCH/ITECA decided for the consultant where to go. The consultant did request what kind of beneficiary he wanted to meet, but this was only partially successful (for example one of the FGD in the CRRPs involved only beneficiaries which had received a CRS shelter – slight bias).
- 3) In the case of CRS, since the DEC-CAFOD intervention fit within a larger WASH programme, it was impossible to get documentation specific to DEC activities, save for what was written in the DEC reports. CRS does not have an internal monthly reporting system. It only provides documentation when requested.
- 4) Similarly, CAFOD did not ask its partners for a formal system of reporting, for example monthly reports fitting a standard format (achievements against objectives, agreed changes against proposal and budget, special issues, partnership visits, etc.). Thus most information could only be gleaned from personal interviews and often with unclear reference to timing as the information had been exchanged by email and telephone and not recorded systematically.
- 5) CAFOD also did not ask its partners to provide a formal explanation of how its funding and support fits into the partner's overall programme strategy.
- 6) It was difficult to obtain beneficiary information on Phase 1 and camp activities generally as those activities ceased at least 9 months ago. A visit to Champ de Mars proved unsuccessful.

### **Key documents reviewed**

1. Partner contracts and the proposals, expenditure and narrative reports sent to the DEC (Phases 1 and 2.1)
2. CAFOD documents such as the Haiti Country Strategy 2010-2013, the CAFOD Humanitarian Strategy 2010-2020 and the CAFOD Humanitarian Ways of Working.
3. Reports on CAFOD staff visits to Haiti
4. Minimum Agency Standards for Incorporating Protection into Humanitarian Response, 2008, Caritas Australia
5. CRS documentation on the feedback and complaints hotline (Tande M)
6. CRS Camp WASH KAP survey of August 2011
7. CRS CRRP WASH beneficiary satisfaction survey, 21 December 2011
8. CaCH-ITECA meeting reports
9. ITECA reconstruction strategy



## **Key Informant Interviews**

Individual interviews based on a questionnaire (in Annex 2) were held with 7 CAFOD staff, 5 CRS staff and 3 CaCH/ITECA staff. The key informants interviewed were:

### ***CAFOD staff***

1	Mike Noyes	Head of Humanitarian Programmes
2	Matthew Carter	Humanitarian Director
3	Robert Cruickshank	Senior Emergency Response Officer for Asia and L.A.
4	Clare Dixon	Regional Manager for Latin America and the Caribbean
5	Sarah Marsh	Haiti Programme Officer
6	Marie Josette Delorme Pierre	Former Haiti Programme Officer and currently Haiti Accompanier
7	Catherine Cowley	Protection Officer seconded to CRS-Haiti

### ***CRS (Haiti)***

1	Emily Rogers	Accountability Coordinator
2	Laura Dills	Deputy Country Representative - Programming
3	Florence Bijou	Hygiene Promotion Coordinator
4	Daouda Sanou	WASH Coordinator
5	Niek de Goeij	Head of Programming

Other less formal interviews were held with staff from support services.

### ***CaCH and ITECA (Haiti)***

1	Gerald Pompilus	CaCH Engineer
2	Chenet Jean Baptiste	ITECA Executive Director
3	Peter Eppler	CaCH Director (Emergency)

Other less formal interviews were held with other staff of ITECA (the communications officer and the lead engineer).

It was not possible to secure an interview with Trocaire.

## 4. Key Findings

The findings are based primarily on the KIIs, the FGDs, informal staff interviews, the small beneficiary survey, the document review and personal observations.

### 1. Overview

Since all the field activities were not conducted by CAFOD but through 3 partners: 2 international contractual partners (CRS and CaCH) and one indirect and national agency (contract between CaCH and ITECA but ITECA and CAFOD had been partners in the past), the findings will cover all 4 agencies but as much as possible the 3 partners only for their DEC funded portion of the work. The CaCH-ITECA partnership was founded on the technical and project management competence of CaCH and the social competence of ITECA.

### CAFOD

- 1) The partnership CAFOD-CRS was the best solution in this case for Haiti and produced good results, both in Phase 1 and 2, as CRS made an early commitment to WASH with rapid scaling up partly because CAFOD kept closely involved and offered skills and staff support.
- 2) The partnership CAFOD-CaCH seemed a good solution and produced acceptable results but after incurring delays, cost overruns and discontentment between CaCH and its Haitian partner ITECA. CAFOD treated the CaCH relationship as a would a donor rather than a partner.
- 3) CAFOD treated its two contractual international partners very differently and did not at all get involved with its former national partner ITECA.
- 4) CAFOD had little documentation regarding either project other than what was strictly required by the DEC. There were no monthly reports (internal or from partners), no detailed project description with maps and only a few staff trip reports to Haiti. Most of the information was held in the Head of Humanitarian Programming's memory and work emails. There is a central repository only of DEC contractual documents.
- 5) The visibility of CAFOD is inexistant. On the positive side, this means that the Gressier houses are not "branded", like so much of the US aid. On the negative side, no one and even some of CAFOD's own partners on the ground do not know of CAFOD's involvement.

### CRS

- 1) CRS does not have an internal WASH emergency capacity nor a WASH emergency strategy/policy and will likely struggle again in the next emergency. This could be improved in cooperation with sister agencies like CAFOD who are prioritising and developing an emergency WASH capacity.
- 2) There is difficulty in getting up-to-date and disaggregated information. There is a need for better reporting, beyond weekly indicator tracking reports.
- 3) While CRS has a good indicator based M&E system, it lacks quality and qualitative monitoring. For example regular and punctual visits for overall quality checking (not just numbers and beneficiary satisfaction but also against the best expected impact, both technical and social using questions such as why/why not? How/how much? This qualitative monitoring should include issues of safety, access, Do No Harm, completeness, DRR/CCA, etc.). The information gained from the baseline and endline is not particularly informative as the baseline was implemented several months after activities had started.

- 4) Thanks to CAFOD's active support, CRS in Haiti is now a model of good practice for beneficiary accountability due to management commitment and dedicated staff. But it takes some time and continuous effort for the commitment to spread throughout the organisation, especially to field staff.
- 5) There seem to be elements of institutional heaviness in logistics with warehouse management by different sections with multiple layers of administration and some gaps in harmonising the 3 layers of M&E and Quality Control management. But it is a common issue of adjusting the field realities to those of financial and procedural good practice (also to avoid corruption), often with a time lag for operations to catch up to field demands with delays in the ramping up phase and then in adjusting to the ramping down. In the case of CRS, the large T-shelter programme dictated many of the operational issues.
- 6) CRS performed well essential WASH services in the camps after a steep learning curve (and with assistance from CAFOD) and has started a longer term integrated process for difficult urban WASH activities with good initial results but with still an unbalanced focus on quantity rather than quality, including beneficiary participation and empowerment and social processes as part of the objectives and indicators.
- 7) DEC funded about 62% in Phase 1 and 35% in Phase 2 of the CRS WASH component until January 2012. WASH represents only 5% of global CRS Haiti spending.
- 8) DEC funds 100% of WASH in the CRRPs of Nerette and Solino (about 80% of total) with the rest (20%) in the other 3 CRRPs also supported by Caritas Australia.
- 9) From the survey and FGDs, there is a high satisfaction with all WASH activities (camps and CRRPs) with just some complaints about receiving information late. Many drums (due to a supply break and now remedied) and a few downpipes are missing, but all is well built, installed and appreciated. The rainwater water collected is not used for drinking.
- 10) The latrines seem well targeted, very appreciated, well used and shared. While they are of good technical quality, there is a need to find a way to reduce breakage of the cabin walls during transport from the factory to individual sites. There is good use of community masons for latrine rehabilitation. The two main weaknesses noted are:
  - a) many beneficiaries have not read and understood the beneficiary agreement. They will need more support to understand that all maintenance is the responsibility of the latrine users.
  - b) there needs to be a follow-up on the overall quality of the infrastructure (there are several missing screens and seat covers, there often is not a good seal between seat cover and seat and there are issues of beneficiary access and safety (involving steps, handholds and specific door openings).
- 11) Hygiene Promotion is well implemented with door to door and group activities, including children and in schools and evolving into more community self-maintaining activities. The only weakness noted was a lack of specific attention to at-risk families.
- 12) The waste management is a particular success, due partly to CRS's additional effort to link with the services of private companies for refuse removal. Communities are encouraged to perform regular waste collection. About half of the respondents say their neighbourhoods are now cleaner than before the EQ and appreciate the CRS effort. The two weaknesses noted were more to do with Quality management: not enough attention to at-risk families and not enough reflection for improving the impact and sustainability of HP activities.

13) The only weakness noted is that a few of the WASH committees mention that they did and can organise themselves to perform waste collection activities but that they now tend to depend on CRS for motivation.

14) While CRS has deliberately chosen not to be involved in water provision in the CRRPs (as they are good enough alternatives in place), beneficiaries express a great appreciation for the gutters and drums attached to the CRS shelters. The DEC funded water filters (about 800) distributed in May/June 2011 are still in use but not for drinking water, only for cooking (lack of trust and taste). The DEC funded filters were of a poor design where there is a high risk of re-contamination of the clean water through manual handling of the filter outlet (and they were delivered after CRS had pulled out of the camp with no follow-up).



### **CaCH**

- 1) The activities partially achieved their purpose, estimated at 70% overall: 69 houses (out of the initially planned 100) are DEC funded and 70% (estimated and to be verified) of well targeted beneficiaries.
- 2) While the technical results of the 100 house pilot phase are excellent, it suffered from cost overruns and delays and institutional frictions which prevent current agreements to continue past the pilot phase as both the CAFOD-CaCH and the CaCH-ITECA partnerships are dissolved at its completion.
- 3) The 36m<sup>2</sup> houses ended up costing \$12,500 each (as against \$6,300 initially), partly due to added features such as a third room, the rain water harvesting system and a VIP latrine but also due to a more expensive than technically necessary roof (+\$900), non-preventable additional transport costs (+\$1,000) and high labour costs (\$3,000). The houses are at the top end of similar reconstruction projects both for construction quality and for amenities.
- 4) The technical implementation of the houses, rain water harvesting systems and VIP latrines is excellent. But sometimes there are no steps when the slab is more than 20cm high, which is a safety concern.
- 5) The investment costs for house design and construction and project set-up continue to bear fruit as ITECA and possibly Trócaire continue to build similar houses.
- 6) CaCH-Haiti continues to build houses but by direct implementation and significantly cheaper (\$8,000 versus \$12,500 but with fewer amenities).
- 7) After the initial push by ITECA for stonewalled houses, only 7% of houses were built of stone. The majority are of the square design. Stonewalled houses have several disadvantages compared to concrete block houses.
- 8) At the time of the evaluation, the beneficiaries had only been given the keys to the houses the day before and had not yet been living in the houses. There remained some rain water harvesting systems and latrines to be completed.

- 9) The builders were well trained and closely followed-up by both ITECA and CaCH engineers with additional concrete batch testing and step-by-step quality control.
- 10) The beneficiaries were satisfied with the relationships with the builders, technicians and engineers but expressed a level of dissatisfaction with the selection process. In about 5 zones, the houses were predominantly assigned to members of a few extended family (2-3) rather than spread out to more families (4-8).
- 11) There were transparency issues between the stakeholders, for example CaCH-Haiti knew of CAFOD's funding but not that it was the major funder as its proportion kept changing and CaCH-Haiti did not know about CAFOD's other Haiti commitments until early 2011. ITECA was never informed of CAFOD's involvement in the project, though it was the primary contributor and a former CAFOD project partner and was only made aware of it through ITECA's own informal channels.

## **ITECA**

- 1) The project was managed primarily by the Executive Director with little delegation.
- 2) ITECA has much experience in long term community development but it did not have the experience of a large emergency construction project with its high level of contractual and management demands.
- 3) ITECA has found other donors to build an additional 575 houses, 500 with Développement et Paix ("Caritas Canada") with the support of a Canadian company to manufacture interlocking blocks and 75 more houses with ICCO using the CaCH-ITECA model.

The less than optimum results from the CAFOD-CaCH-ITECA partnership are attributed to 5 key factors:

- 1) The very long chain of information and authority which led to a lack of transparency and poor communications all around:
  - . 1 CAFOD London - 2 CaCH Lucerne - 3 CaCH Haiti - 4 ITECA - 5 beneficiaries  
where as in most other cases it is more direct:
  - . 1 CAFOD London - 2 NGO in-country - 3 beneficiaries (such as with the CRS partnership)
- 2) CAFOD related with CaCH as a donor rather than as a partner agency (unlike the relationship with CRS in Haiti) while it previously had a partner relationship with ITECA but chose not to reactivate it.
- 3) Intrinsic and significant institutional differences:
  - c) ITECA with more than 30 years of community involvement in Gressier, with political clout, part of a national ideological movement (Mouvement Paysan) and with long term international partners (many Caritas agencies ) but no expertise in permanent housing or large emergency construction project management and dependent on a strong executive director.
  - d) CaCH-Emergency only arrived in country after the EQ (though CaCH-development, with only 1 staff at the time of the EQ, had been in Haiti 30 years but only involved in small partner projects), starting from scratch but with the support of CaCH-Development to get established, also with many of the same international partners (many Caritas agencies) but with permanent housing and large emergency project management expertise.
- 4) The CaCH contract states that ITECA could feedback on the technical issues, but CaCH could not feedback on the social issues, as these had been delegated as being solely ITECA's remit. CaCH now has a social unit and had the limited support of Caritas Luxemburg during early part of the pilot project.

5) ITECA did not assign a staff as Project Manager and the project was managed directly by the Executive Director when available. Even after the presentation of findings, the Exec. Dir. did not agree with the utility of an ITECA Housing Project Manager, even though it is mandated in the CaCH-ITECA contract, the post is included in the ITECA budget and it was also noted as a weakness in another independent evaluation (by URD and mandated by a CaCH back donor "la Chaine du Bonheur"). The Exec. Dir. thought that one of their engineers could function as a team leader for the 2 other engineers and one technician, although he had no interaction with beneficiary mobilisation or logistics, both of which were instrumental in the delays.

## **WASH**

Phase 1 (WASH in the camps) lasted 6 months in the initial primary emergency and could not be evaluated in depth nearly 18 months later as beneficiaries do not have the perception of distinct project phases and much the same WASH activities continued into Phase 2 until about March 2011, except for the NFI distributions and the small protection activities.

However, it can be ascertained from beneficiaries and staff comments that the WASH response in the camps until March 2011 was largely successful considering the constraints early on: new WASH (and other) team, slow internal CRS procedures and lack of space for WASH infrastructure. The transition to WASH in the CRRPs was delayed by up to three months primarily by the cholera epidemic due to the need for continuous Hygiene Promotion, rigorous water and sanitation management and the CRS emphasis on a massive shelter construction campaign as a way into the CRRPs.

## **2. Specific DEC elements to evaluate**

### **1) Relevance/appropriateness**

In both cases, the WASH and Shelter responses were completely in line with local needs and priorities. WASH activities are critical in camps, especially in a dense urban environment with the constant threat of water borne epidemics (typhoid, cholera). As CRS is a development agency, it transitioned out of camp activities after handing over to other agencies (which took some effort) and continued into the 5 densely urban and socially and geographically challenging CRRPs using an integrated development model (shelter, livelihoods, WASH/environment, social development) for at least 36 months. CAFOD bypassed the urban transitional shelter phase (based on previous experience in Honduras) as many agencies (such as CRS) were already doing it and decided instead to help pioneer permanent reconstruction with anti-seismic and anti-hurricane houses in a deeply affected, hard of access, poorly assisted rural and mountainous commune with 85% of housing destroyed.

There is a clear case where the CRS partnership has benefitted the WASH programme through the inputs of CAFOD's WASH and Accountability francophone specialist who assisted CRS during several field visits and enabled CRS-Haiti (and beyond) to provide better WASH and Accountability services in the short and longer term.

On the opposite, there is a clear case that the CAFOD-CaCH partnership did not benefit the Shelter programme as CAFOD completely delegated the project delivery to CaCH, not in partnership, but as a contractor. CAFOD could have played more a role of a supporting 'partner' with closer follow up and assistance with the more difficult aspects (institutional and personality differences). Unfortunately the triple partnership CAFOD-CaCH-ITECA did not play a role, although it could have, to reduce delays and bring out the best in each of the partners (CaCH for technicity, ITECA for social engineering and CAFOD for relationship and capacity building).

However, in both cases, the flexibility to allocate and re-allocate DEC funds where most needed by the partners depending on the evolving funding situation was clearly a benefit, in that both projects reached their goals, outside of the strict DEC-CAFOD mandate.

### **2) Connectedness**

In both cases, the WASH and Shelter responses were completely carried out taking the longer-term and interconnected problems into account. Namely to transition out of camps (unsustainable, disjointed approaches, reinforcing dependency and creating an undesirable 'pull' effect) as soon as possible into urban, marginalised and neglected communities (more sustainable, integrated approach, reducing dependency and creating a desirable 'pull' effect) and using emergency funding to assist with essential long term development needs (permanent housing which has critical impact on health, livelihoods and community) in a rural area close to urban centers. Furthermore, due to ITECA's connections, it was able to leverage the 100 house pilot project to mobilise government resources to upgrade 8km of rural roads which had the immediate impact to ease the project's transport difficulties but also to ease transport difficulties for all the area's inhabitants.

However, the only doubt is whether the CRRP communities are fully empowered. CRS has its own objectives to reach (not uncommonly dictated by donor timeframe for results and expenditure) and communities have not been fully involved in the decision making, for example helping to choose vulnerability criteria, the level of community participation over time, the expected impact and NGO exit strategies.

### **3) Coherence**

In both cases, the WASH and Shelter responses were generally coherent with relevant policies, whether at the Haiti level (both government and UN cluster), the policies of Humanitarian Good Practice and with CAFOD's own. This is especially the case as CAFOD completely encouraged CRS to take Accountability seriously as a cross-cutting and mainstream issue both in Haiti and elsewhere.

But, there have been a few weaknesses:

a) Although CRS was initially involved with some Protection issues when it was in the camps, it decided that Protection would not be one of its core mandate (as a distinct sector of activity) and instead to mainstream elements of it into its programming, currently with the assistance of a staff seconded by CAFOD. While there have not been any serious protection issue breaches in the camps and in the CRRPs, there have been examples where at least a Do No Harm approach could have been useful. In the camps, the selection process for WASH CfW often put women at risk of abuse by the unrepresentative camp committees who chose the participants and in the CRRPs, while the neediest have been selected for latrines, they were not always built with the small modifications needed to make them as user friendly and safe as possible (steps, handholds, opening into a safe zone, etc.). In both cases CRS could have put in place steps to mitigate against the real and potential harmful effects on beneficiaries of its interventions.

b) While bypassing the T-shelter phase of reconstruction to directly rebuild with appropriate permanent housing

is particularly coherent with the UN Shelter cluster policies, it is doubtful that CaCH should have 'marketed' the project to the beneficiaries as a 1,700 house project from the start, with the attendant high expectations, especially when the initial funding was only for 100 houses. This is now made worse as CaCH is withdrawing from ITECA and the project at the end of the pilot project and ITECA now has to shoulder the rest of the 1,600 houses to build (a 575 additional houses are on the way).

### **4) Coverage**

In both cases, the WASH and Shelter responses mostly reached the most vulnerable and disadvantaged with assistance suited to their needs but in both cases, a few weaknesses can be noted. With CRS, the CRRP zones selected are the more marginalised and difficult to access (around ravines). Within the CRRP zones, the neediest seem to have been selected for shared latrines construction or rehabilitation (good selection process according to the beneficiary FGD and surveys) but the facilities implemented are not always optimised for their needs (most notable are the occasional lack of steps and handholds). The vulnerability assessment was done only using CRS criteria without community participation but WASH committees were able to convince CRS staff to include other needy families which otherwise failed the CRS vulnerability criteria (such as the case of 17 families in a lakou with no latrine access – a lakou is a communal piece of land where members of an extended live in a cluster of houses). Similarly the HP activities reached everyone more or less equally but without emphasis on the most vulnerable. But all children in schools and in the communities are particularly targeted.

With CaCH-ITECA, the 10 zones chosen out of 43 are representative, of difficult access (3 are only foot accessible) and more populated. But the house beneficiary selection has not reached the most vulnerable and disadvantaged. A rough estimation of appropriate targeting (most vulnerable and disadvantaged) is in the range of 60-80% (as agreed by ITECA's Director) but neither ITECA nor CaCH has done a study of how the beneficiaries were selected and who they really are. For example, in the village where the local government official (CASEC) lives, at least 2 houses were given to families of only 2 members when the average HH size is 4.7 and two cases of several houses given to only one extended family were observed and several more such cases reported in other villages. While there could be good reasons for a family of 2 to receive a house, it is unlikely that 2 of the first 10 houses in a village would qualify, especially if several houses are given to the same extended family.



## **5) Efficiency:**

The WASH activities were generally efficiently implemented in that the costings for infrastructure were appropriate and well researched, the use of local contractors and labour maximised, the staff structure commensurate with the level of effort and a good level of responsibility was delegated to the beneficiaries. Good quality management practices were used and only during the first year were there some CRS internal operational difficulties causing delays and associated inefficiencies (some partly due to the large numbers of new staff and the high turnover of international staff).

The Shelter activities were designed to be implemented efficiently by the CaCH and ITECA partnership but logistical and institutional constraints (some preventable in both cases) led to serious and critical delays. On the plus side, the houses are of very good quality, earthquake and wind resistant, include rain water harvesting, a latrine and are electricity ready. The design continues to be used by ITECA and Trócaire is also using it. There has also been good beneficiary participation and inclusion of local paid and up-skilled labor.

On the minus side, even taking into account the extra transport expenses (\$1,000/house), the houses are more expensive than similar reconstruction houses in the area (perhaps 10-20% (\$1-2,000) due primarily to a more expensive roof (\$900), 3 rooms instead of 2 and a large water storage capacity).

The delays led to the active construction phase to occur during the rainy season caused 2 major difficulties besides the cost overruns:

Very difficult transport and construction issues in mountainous areas with very bad quality dirt tracks

Beneficiaries were less available as they had to work in their fields (only some could afford to pay others to help them with material transport (60 tonnes/house) between where the truck could drop it off and their site, stone gathering and crushing (for foundation and concrete and occasionally for walling (7 houses out of 100), supplying construction water, etc.).

## **6) Effectiveness:**

Both the WASH and Shelter activities were very effective and reached their objectives of reaching some of the neediest earthquake affected Haitians. For the CRRPs, it is only 9 months into an at least 36 month timeframe, but there is a high likelihood of achieving the WASH objectives with having the 5 proximity CRRP offices and general project integration at field level. However, for Shelter, the number of DEC-CAFOD houses is 69 against the projected 100. But the 21 others have been constructed using other funds.

## **7) Impact:**

Both the WASH and Shelter activities have globally had an excellent impact. In the camps, there were very few cases of illness due to the quality/quantity of water and sanitation and a high level of beneficiary satisfaction (FGD). In the CRRPs, there is already a small but significant impact, with a current average improvement of about 20% to 30% latrine coverage in the first 9 months and the majority of beneficiaries understanding, though not always applying, the relationship between good hygiene and waste management practices and better individual and community health. Currently, there is a small doubt on which side of the dependency fine line between community mobilisation/participation and demotivation CRS is acting. While it has great intentions, it does not yet allow full community empowerment with a maximum delegation of authority and a clear exit strategy. This is being partially remedied with the addition of 5 CRRP Community Liaison officers but it will need careful monitoring and support. Implementing an integrated community project with good numbers is fine but empowering communities to achieve more on their own, sustainably but with lower numbers is even better.

Some examples of impact maximisation activities in WASH:

- . support to the bayakous: the bayakou is the 'night soil worker', member of a secret society who empties latrines at night. CRS is assisting them both in terms of livelihoods with the provision of basic equipment and with safety training.
- . children and schools: CRS is assisting all the schools in the CRRPs with the rehabilitation or construction of latrines with attendant training in latrine maintenance and good hygiene practices to be continued by the teachers.
- . shared latrines: in the dense urban environment, sharing latrines is essential for maximising access and CRS tries to have about 3-4 families to share a latrine. This is largely successful. It doesn't work so well when more families share (cases of 15 families have been encountered) as it becomes more of a public latrine.
- . Waste removal hotline: CRS is pioneering a hotline with contracts to semi-public and private contractors for waste removal at more than 100 sites (camps and CRRPs). This is increasingly effective and a motivator for keeping neighborhoods clean. About half of the CRRP beneficiaries mention that their areas are now cleaner than before the EQ.

One of the positive side effects of the cholera epidemic is that Haitians are now much more interested in learning and applying better hygiene practices such as using treated water, using a latrine and washing hands with soap at the relevant times. One of the negative effects from the immediate response phase and the cholera epidemic in camps is that people, though more men than women, want to be paid for any community service rendered. Some see a shared latrine as being "public" and want to either be paid to maintain it or at least to be given the means to do so.

For Shelter activities the social impact is less than optimum at beneficiary and group level, but good for the zones (10 selected out of 43 zones). There is no socio-demographic information on beneficiaries available (this is an ITECA responsibility).

- a) The average occupancy is 4.3 though the average HH size is 4.7
- b) the side-benefit of the 8 km of rural road construction is of undeniable benefit to many more communities
- c) the up-skilling of local labour will have a long lasting impact
- d) the 'marketing' of the project (1,700 houses) with a 100 pilot houses has raised expectations with two results: 1) it now motivates people with other communal activities (road works) in view of the next 575 houses on the way and 2) it has diminished the social pressure for partisanship in beneficiary selection (though is yet to be verified with the current 100 families).

### **8) Gender:**

The gender issue has been well addressed in the CRS-WASH activities but less so in the CaCH-ITECA Shelter activities. Throughout the FGD, KII and observations it can be ascertained that CRS addressed well the gender issue. For example, whenever possible, all property ownership was established in both the women and men's name. The only exception is that in some cases the community WASH committees have been formed from recycled neighborhood committees disproportionately male.

With ITECA, gender issues were generally addressed, women were part of the construction committees, part of all the decision making and are equal owners of the houses. However, they are not well represented amongst beneficiaries, only 44% although the initial census has women representing 50% of the population and there are 3 (out of 10) zones where women beneficiaries are under-represented by 30-60%. ITECA has no explanation for these discrepancies.

### **3. DEC accountability framework elements**

#### **A) Have the proposed objectives and outcomes have been achieved**

Yes, in both cases, although the numbers of beneficiaries have changed over time, the outcomes have largely been achieved. But only in Shelter has there been a significant reduction of objectives and outcomes as the objective of 100 DEC funded houses is only 69% achieved due to rising costs and additional delays, but the outcomes of 100 pilot houses has been achieved with additional funding. Also the targeting of Shelter beneficiaries is unclear and likely to be sub-optimum.

#### **B) Have Code of Conduct and Sphere Standards have been respected**

Interestingly there have been breaches of both but for different reasons:

For the Code of Conduct there was good compliance with CRS but not with CaCH-ITECA. There is one acknowledged case of house beneficiary partisanship in the zone (Ti Ginen) of the local government representative (CASEC) and there are indications (from other beneficiaries and not verified) that they may be a few more in other project zones.

While CaCH-ITECA completely respected the Sphere standards (in terms of housing and water/sanitation), CRS could not completely comply with the standards in the camps. However, it was recognised by the WASH cluster that the Sphere standards could not be universally applied in the urban Haiti situation and special dispensations were applied. However, CRS tried hard to comply, did so reasonably, and the beneficiaries reported satisfaction with the services rendered.

#### **C) What is the level of involvement of and accountability to beneficiaries?**

In both cases there has been generally a good level of involvement of and accountability to beneficiaries but in both cases there are weaknesses:

a) For CRS, in WASH at least, beneficiary participation needs to go further and needs to be included in all programming from the start. Looking at the 5 phases of Participation, while there has been good effort at Information and Consultation, the Involvement (deciding together+sweat equity), Collaboration (acting together) and Empowerment (supporting others) need further development. Examples for greater beneficiary participation from the camp and CRRP activities could include a joint definition of vulnerability, at-risk behaviour and joint programming with exit strategies. As an example, several WASH committee members assured the consultant that they used to organise their own solid waste campaigns and collected money to do this and could do so again. But if CRS provides the tools, the planning and the incentives (a small meal at the end of each campaign), it demotivates these communities to manage this themselves. Thanks to CAFOD's encouragement CRS now has an effective accountability department. There are accountability posters in all the CRRPs and the CRRP offices and most beneficiaries know of the hotline. This feedback and complaints hotline receives less than 25 non-sensitive WASH calls each month (30% of all), mostly to do with delays and other informational issues.

c) For CaCH-ITECA, there was good beneficiary participation in that they were able to properly feedback into the design, assist with the construction and participate in other decisions. Accountability to the point of beneficiary selection seems good but the process and result of beneficiary selection has not been made clear from ITECA.

## **D) To what extent past lessons or recommendations have been fulfilled?**

This information has to be collected from all 4 stakeholders.

### 1) CAFOD

CAFOD applied a few critical lessons learned from past experience:

- a) from its Honduras hurricane experience, it decided to bypass the T-shelter stage and aim for permanent house reconstruction.
- b) it decided to operate through international and national partners rather than become operational as more efficient and based on its ethos and approach.
- c) it has developed in-house specialist expertise in several essential fields for emergencies and used them to support its activities through partners, in this case both in WASH and Accountability
- d) similarly it has developed policy documents, such as the Humanitarian Ways of Working, has put them in practice and is now in the process of revising them in view of further lessons learned

### 2) CRS

No staff (senior management or not) at CRS in Haiti could find any documentation, past or current, referring to past or new lessons or recommendations for CRS WASH in emergencies. This was explained in two ways: 1) CRS globally does not have WASH vision or commitment (though is reported to be considering it) and 2) the lessons and recommendations learned are only in the heads of a few CRS WASH specialists who spent a few weeks in Haiti, primarily at the beginning.

### 3) CaCH

CaCH was only able to provide documents in German and no synthesis in English of lessons learned and recommendations. While German is the natural language for CaCH, as an international organisation it should also produce essential documents in English.

### 4) ITECA

ITECA does not have the experience of large emergency projects to contribute. But it has experience of community mobilisation. It is not clear if it applied any institutionalised lessons learned or recommendations.

#### **4. Specific questions**

##### **WASH**

*a) To what extent did the work take into account the needs and concerns of beneficiaries?*

There needs to be a differentiation between camp WASH and CRRP WASH. CRS's WASH activities fall into the 4 pillars: water, sanitation, hygiene promotion and waste management.

In the case of camp WASH, CRS did as well as expected within the space, logistics and social constraints. CRS provided potable water, latrines with hand washing facilities, showers, hygiene promotion, solid waste management and drainage canal digging and maintenance. Some services were provided through a CFW system of payment (water and latrine attendants, drainage canal digging and maintenance, community mobilisers). The only weakness was the issue of beneficiary selection for WASH CFW through the camp committees for two reasons: 1) actual selection based on social connections rather than on criteria and 2) allegations of abuse of women to gain employment.

In the case of the CRRPs, the beneficiaries generally expressed a "need" for CRS to deliver everything and to pay them. Their biggest concern is livelihoods, now that CRS has largely addressed their shelter needs, which CRS also tackles in their livelihood component. But for WASH, their biggest concern, even ahead of sanitation, was the management of solid waste and CRS has now included this in their remit, both at the local CRRP level and among about 100 other camps by providing a telephone hotline and links to various waste collection private companies who get paid by the m<sup>3</sup> properly disposed. However, regular or agreed pick-up times are still undependable enough to discourage better community mobilisation (who wants live next to a pile of rubbish?).

CRS decided not to deal with the issue of water provision as people have reasonable access to various water sources, some treated. The DEC funding provided rain water catchments on all the CRS shelters to bring partial help during the rainy season and the beneficiaries appreciate it for non-drinking purposes.

For latrines, CRS addresses the issue well, both from the sociological aspect (beneficiary selection and latrine sharing) and from the technical standpoint (either the rehabilitation of an existing pit latrine or the construction of a double vault latrine – the double vault allows for the 'composting' of the waste leading to significant advantages: a) the fecal matter is more solid and less dangerous to handle, b) the beneficiaries have the time to collect money for emptying the vault by the bayakou (about \$50 for dry matter as against about \$200 for wet matter), c) simple matter of removing the slab to access the pit instead of having to break it, as in the standard latrine slabs.

Hygiene promotion is a constant activity, usually done both in groups and by individual family visits and with a particular emphasis on children, both in schools (with latrine infrastructures) and in the communities. While there had not been a focus on vulnerability, there is now an interest to focus on at-risk behaviour instead. CRS staff has largely provided all the HP activities though they were assisted by beneficiary Hygiene Promotion Mobilisers in the camps and there is now an interest to make it more self-replicating in the CRRPs through school teachers and the WASH committees.

*b) Were the needs of the most vulnerable addressed?*

Yes in terms of targeting both in camps and in the CRRPs. But not completely in terms of total quality such as including aspects of access and safety in the case of latrines and a general Do No Harm approach with regards to beneficiaries generally. Also the criteria for WASH 'most vulnerable' need to be culturally adjusted and include 'most at risk' and this needs to be done with community participation.

*c) To what extent were beneficiaries involved in the planning and execution of the WASH project?*

This aspect is somewhat limited in camp situations but there could have been more beneficiary involvement or at least representation in the selection of CFW participants. There should have been more beneficiary participation and ownership in the CRRP project from the start and this is now being remedied. During the emergency response there was considerable pressure to achieve numbers and CRS is still slightly too numbers oriented and needs to also include more beneficiary participation and empowerment and social processes as part of the objectives and indicators.

*d) Was input from beneficiaries used to appropriately change/improve the project?*

This is of course difficult to achieve in that beneficiaries always ask an NGO to provide them with everything. But within what was possible, beneficiary feedback was used to improve the latrine design, to include waste management as a WASH activity and to schedule activities for convenience and impact.

### **Shelter**

*a) Were the implementing partners involved (Caritas Switzerland and ITECA) able to coordinate effectively with the relevant stakeholders involved in the construction of the housing, including UN cluster, local authorities?*

Both CaCH and ITECA coordinated well with their respective stakeholders. ITECA with the Mairie de Gressier, ASEC and CASEC for all the legal documentation and procedures such that all beneficiaries have a legal document from the Mairie attributing them land and house. The eventual final step of registration in the communal cadastre will take some time. The Mairie also approved the house project as satisfying national norms. The UN cluster was not particularly relevant to this project but was consulted and assigned the Ti Boucan section of Gressier to CaCH. ITECA was able to mobilise the CNE (a government road building agency) to improve 8 kms of one of the project roads for year round truck access.

*b) How does Caritas Switzerland construction compare to similar projects in the area?*

The technical quality of the houses is excellent and includes rainwater harvesting and individual latrines (the latter two are not always provided). However, even excluding the additional transport cost for the rural area, they are more expensive due primarily to three factors: a) the change from a simple 2 panel roof to a more complicated 4 panel roof, the provision of 3 rooms instead of the more common 2 rooms and the provision of a rainwater harvesting system.

*c) How has downward accountability to beneficiaries been managed?*

Beneficiary accountability was delegated to ITECA and due to its role in the development of the local communities, with many local Farmer Associations, there was much community participation in the planning and implementation of the project, including in the design through the construction of 4 prototypes. Beneficiaries expressed complete satisfaction with ITECA, save for the beneficiary selection as some of them indicated elements of unfairness. CaCH was not involved in the beneficiary accountability process and the beneficiary selection process remains unclear.

*d) To what extent were beneficiaries involved in the design and planning of the project? Was input from beneficiaries used to appropriately change/improve the project?*

Beneficiaries were completely involved in the design, though it seems that design changes are partly due to ITECA (roof, use of stonewalls) and partly due to the beneficiaries (wooden windows, internal passages and 2<sup>nd</sup> door). The use of natural stone for the walls, as promoted by ITECA, has three major disadvantages: 1) the hard work of collection and transport is the responsibility of the beneficiary (in kind or through paying someone to do it, as not all zones have easy access to natural stone) whereas cement blocks come "free", 2) stone walls use more cement and thus cost more, 3) masons have to be better supervised to ensure proper construction (block walls are more uniform and easier to do quality control). In the end only 7 of 100 houses were built with stone walls, though much effort was spent on developing the concept.

Beneficiaries were also very involved in the construction. Unfortunately, the delays increased the labour and financial cost burden on the beneficiaries but it was out of their control. Most beneficiaries had unplanned expenses in providing labour and/or materials for house construction or to replace their labor in the fields (also causing construction delays on their part). It is estimated that this costs up to \$750 and it is clear that in terms of planning, beneficiaries would rather have avoided house construction during the rainy season.

For the design, all beneficiaries expressed that they would have rather have had a 4 room house and they would have built the porch themselves, meaning that CaCH could have built a 3 room house without a porch (a porch does not have to be anti-seismic) for a lower cost (smaller footprint: foundation, slab and roof).

*e) How has transparency been assured between the implementing partners?*

Transparency has not been well achieved between the implementing partners and the contractual minimal has been achieved with great difficulty. There were regular joint meetings, some technical and some managerial, the latter also somewhat mediated by the a member Développement et Paix, another CI agency supporting the project. Differing philosophies, realities and personalities made it difficult and there is no evidence that steps were undertaken to improve the relationship.

### **CAFOD Added Value**

*a) How did CAFOD's involvement and partnership with CRS and Caritas Switzerland bring added value to the programme overall?*

It is clear that CAFOD's involvement and partnership with CRS was of added value not only to the project on the ground but also to CRS both in Haiti and globally. Similarly, it is also clear that CAFOD did not bring any added value to the Shelter project, save to provide a significant level of flexible funding. The relationship with CaCH could not be construed as a partnership and the involvement was limited, even though it had the potential to be much more.

*b) Was CAFOD's involvement in the different sectors of the programme relevant, appropriate, and coherent? What could have been managed differently?*

CAFOD's involvement with CRS in WASH was completely relevant, appropriate and coherent as CAFOD had in-house expertise in emergency and francophone WASH and the willingness to use it. While it had no such technical capacity for Shelter, hence the "partnership" with CaCH, who had that expertise, CAFOD could have played a role in the non-technical part of the project, as it did with CRS, at least with accountability but also for the local partner capacity building and to ease the relationship between CaCH and ITECA when it became apparent by early 2011 that it would be a difficult one. Had it done so, it could have benefitted the project to overcome its two main weaknesses: a) reduction of cost overruns and delays and b) better accountability and thus better beneficiary selection. A solution would have been to employ a Haitian with expertise and credibility in both cultures (Haiti and International) to be both a mediator and a capacity builder. One such a person was already employed by CAFOD at the time in the person of a Haitian Programme Officer who briefly visited ITECA a few times and who had the remit of assisting local CAFOD partners, but not ITECA, not a current CAFOD partner.

*c) Was the intervention appropriate in facilitating longer terms interventions or impacts?*

Yes, for both WASH and Shelter, but for different reasons. In WASH, it was CRS's decision to transition out of camps into urban communities whereas for Shelter it was CAFOD's initial decision not to get involved in transitional shelters but in permanent reconstruction. In both cases, the DEC funding was instrumental in supporting interventions lasting beyond the DEC funding phase due to the commitment of the 3 partners on the ground.

*d) How does this programme fit within CAFOD's overall approach?*

The programme does fit well within CAFOD's overall approach as stated in its Humanitarian Strategy 2010-2020 with the three themes of Humanitarian Protection, Reducing Risks and Humanitarian Assistance. It also fits in that CAFOD aims to have WASH expertise in emergencies.

a) Humanitarian Protection: this was prevalent in Phase 1 and during camp activities. CAFOD encouraged CRS with the assistance of Trócaire to include this element. Now CRS is attempting to mainstream its basic elements into all its activities, partly with the assistance of a CAFOD staff seconded to CRS for a few months, instead of keeping it as full-fledged intervention sector of its own.

b) Reducing Risks and strengthening resilience: WASH activities both in software (Hygiene Promotion, waste clean-up campaigns, etc.) and in hardware (infrastructure such as latrine and drainage canal construction and rehabilitation, etc.) are health risk reducing in the short and long term. The construction of permanent quake-resistant houses undeniably reduces the risk and strengthen resilience for the beneficiary families.

c) Humanitarian Assistance: CAFOD was very quick in engaging with capable partners on the ground to deliver essential services.



## **5. Conclusion, Lessons Learned and Recommendations**

### ***Conclusion***

The general conclusion is that CAFOD made a good decision not to become operational in Haiti and to work through international Caritas agencies committed to Haiti in the two critical areas of WASH and Shelter. The two projects have been successful, both in Phase 1 in WASH and in Phase 2 both in WASH and Shelter in reaching some of the neediest Haitians and with a solid impact beyond the emergency response. CAFOD was a full partner with regard to CRS in WASH as it approached and worked with CRS-Haiti directly, but it maintained a donor-grantee relationship throughout with regards to CaCH as it was approached by and only worked with CaCH-Lucerne and did not become directly involved in any way with CaCH in Haiti and its local partner ITECA. While there is no certainty that, had CAFOD exhibited a fuller extent of partnership with CaCH-Haiti and ITECA the major outcomes of the delays such as cost overruns and a difficult relationship with ITECA would have been different, at least it would have exercised due diligence as a Caritas partner and be truer to its partnership commitment as stated in its Ways of Working, CAFOD Accountability Framework and its Haiti Country Strategy).

Although CAFOD was the prime DEC contractor, some project specific recommendations will also be made for the three other implementation partners.

### ***Lessons Learned or to be Learned***

While some of the lessons learned are placed in the section where they were perceived, they often also pertain more generally.

#### **General**

- 1) In a large emergency, the key resource lacking for up to a year is technical and project management expertise, both for programmes and support services (procurement and logistics particularly). In the case of Haiti, this is a recurrent theme among many INGOs, and CRS in this case.

#### **CAFOD**

- 2) With regards to partners, although the DEC contract was signed between CAFOD London and CaCH Lucerne, CAFOD should have been more involved both with CaCH-Haiti and its former partner ITECA for two reasons: 1) to ensure that CAFOD's own policies (on gender, accountability and protection for example) are understood (and if possible respected) by all implementing agencies and 2) to be able to offer support where possible, especially to national partners (and with the inter-institution relationship in this case).

#### **CRS**

- 3) Prepare the transitioning from camps and into neighborhoods within the first month and implement as soon as possible. This is also a common comment from NGOs staying in Haiti into the rehabilitation and development phases.
- 4) Consolidate camp interventions into a smaller geographical area (less spread out). This is a common comment from many other NGOs in Haiti.
- 5) Consolidate into fewer CRRPs (3 instead of 5 and close to the Phase 1 camp activities).
- 6) Mainstream accountability and protection (Do No Harm, access, safety, dignity) at field level from the beginning. But this requires dedicated staff training, support and monitoring at a time when team are new, inexperienced and heavily involved in service delivery with a heavy pressure to achieve numbers.

- 7) Use or set up more accountable beneficiary representative structures than the oft self-selected committees. This is also a common comment from many NGOs.

### **CaCH**

- 8) Define the project in more realistic terms (expected impact, budget, transport and timeline), such as a 100 house pilot project rather than a 1,700 house project. It is better to underestimate and undersell the expected results than the opposite.
- 9) Building prototypes and letting people chose was an excellent method to obtain social ownership and respond best to beneficiary need. However, the 4 prototypes built only represent 2 significant design alternatives whereas they could have offered 4 real alternatives (2 were built of the same materials and 2 were built on the same floor plan and all have the same 3 rooms and porch, whereas beneficiaries indicated they would have liked 4 rooms and no porch, as one example). All prototypes, however, would have to have a similar cost.
- 10) Establish more specific roles and responsibilities in the implementing partner contract. Ensure that there are as few grey areas as possible (jointly the partners will .....). This is particularly the case for logistics, procurement when both partners have different roles to play.

### **ITECA**

- 11) A project of this size and tight timeframe needs a dedicated Project Manager from the beginning and who has no other responsibilities. Leaving the project management solely with the executive director also leads to concentration of power, a lack of operational redundancy and a lack of wider institutional learning.

## **Recommendations**

Similarly with the lessons learned, placed in the section where they were perceived but they often also pertain more generally.

### **General**

- 1) In a large emergency response, CARITAS partners (such as CAFOD and CRS) should assist each other either by seconding relevant staff for technical and project management and also to help recruit for international positions through their own networks, especially when a specific foreign language is required. Other agencies such as World Vision, CARE, OXFAM and others combine human resources in an emergency response.
- 2) If an agency or group of sister agencies aspire to be front line emergency responders, they need to have an active roster of experts able to be deployed at short notice. This roster can be made up of internal staff and external individuals. The best example of this is OXFAM's Humanitarian Support Professionals. There is often a critical period after the first 2-3 months when the emergency responders leave and the arrival of long term specialist staff a few months later.
- 3) Similarly, the same agency(ies) should have ready access to basic and plane-deployable equipment and supplies for: water treatment (tablets, filters, etc.), water quality testing, IEC materials, etc....
- 4) All partnerships should involve the sharing of evaluations, studies and other documentation relevant to the activities achieved in partnership.
- 5) When having multiple stakeholders/partnerships (direct and indirect), there should be at least one meeting together at the start to establish the relationships (formal and informal), a level of transparency and perform a stakeholder analysis (strengths and weaknesses, joint histories and interests, etc.). Ideally, other regular meetings should be planned throughout the project (perhaps every 3 months during field visits).
- 6) Replicate the successes of the CAFOD-CRS relationship and offer other partners support using CAFOD's internal emergency expertise such as in WASH and Accountability but also others.
- 7) During emergencies, there is difficulty in getting up-to-date and synthesised information as often only global essential quantitative indicators are tracked. It could be useful to instigate a system of simple monthly and quarterly standardised reports with both quantitative and qualitative aspects, both at the global and individual zone level (for example for each camp (12), CRRP (5) and each house building zone (10) with a level of disaggregated data (gender, age, vulnerability). This is not only valuable for writing reports but also for institutional memory.

### **CAFOD**

- 8) With regards to DEC funding: although the reporting requirements for DEC funding are light, CAFOD should keep its own partner activity tracking table in a monthly summary table. This would facilitate the monitoring and evaluation processes and provide better documentation for institutional memory and lesson learning.
- 9) With regards to partners:
  - a) for accountability, redundancy and fairness, CAFOD should require the same basic documentation from all its contractual partners, regardless of the donor, such as a standard monthly report, rather than rely only on verbal communications and emails.

- a) CAFOD should assist its partners (direct and indirect as in this case) to satisfy and to internally mainstream CAFOD's own declared humanitarian policies such as in Accountability and Protection and compliance with Codes of Conduct, Codes of Good Practice, Sphere and others.
  - c) CAFOD should attempt to negotiate a more direct information sharing and communication channel with the agency closest to the beneficiaries, besides the contractual layers of management and responsibility, to ensure greater transparency and responsiveness as a true partner. No matter the nature of the contractual relationships, CAFOD is still responsible to its donors for the sub-contracted activities.
- 10) Better define "partners" and "partnerships". While trust is an essential element of partnership it should not be at the cost of accountability and insuring good practice all around. Does a contract between CAFOD and a partner negate the other aspects of partnership, such as support with understanding of (if not with compliance with) CAFOD's social policies and a right of oversight over the key elements of actual project impact, regardless of the contractual arrangements? For example, when an indirectly contracted national civil society agency (and in this case a former CAFOD partner) does not have the experience of a large emergency project with its high level of contractual and management obligations, should CAFOD offer it some support?
  - 11) In all contracts, there should be a clause on the level of visibility required by CAFOD. For example while branding each shelter might be unnecessary and counter-productive, at least CAFOD's logo should be included on field signage and other official documentation.

## **CRS**

- 12) With Hygiene Promotion there is a need to focus more on those families more at-risk, which involve issues of not only of vulnerability but also of location (next to environmental or geographical hazards) and attitudes other less easily defined specificities.
- 13) When investing in the CRRPs, community engagement is an essential first activity in itself (assisted a year later by the liaison officers) and should not be left solely to technical field staff. It is essential for: more accurate individual and social assessments, reducing dependency, creating trust in communities and with NGO, enhancing real participation with joint workplans with clear exit strategies, putting accountability first. WASH committees are a mixed lot (some are recycled committees with few women) and need an amount of tailored capacity building (perhaps within a wider context than just WASH).
- 14) Project baselines (including KAP) should be performed at the beginning of each project and not a few months after activities have started.
- 15) A significant numbers of beneficiaries did not know about *Tande M*, the CRS feedback and complaint hotline. All field staff need to encouragement to effectively promote accountability, particularly the new community liaison officers.
- 16) Perform an internal/external WASH evaluation before mid-2012 with the involvement of CRS HQ (and CAFOD?) for several reasons: a) as a mid-term CRRP WASH lesson learning exercise (transitioning from WASH in camps to neighborhoods), b) to enable adjustments in the CRRP strategy and its implementation (verifying the assumptions and causalities), c) to validate the Haiti effort and perhaps establish or help to revise some foundational WASH documents to be shared internally and with partners. CRS had its Shelter programme evaluated, why not WASH?

**CaCH**

- 17) Perform an end-of-project evaluation (as mandated in the CaCH-ITECA contract) and share the report with all the partners.
- 18) Provide beneficiaries with a quasi-legal document stating the gift of the house and the responsibilities of all parties.

**ITECA**

- 19) ITECA should be encouraged to reflect on and document its lessons learned during its first experience of a large emergency project, including the issues of accountability (beneficiary and partners) and project management.

***Strategic Question***

- 20) In the case of large grant to be implemented by partners in difficult circumstances and in a short time period, is it worth considering placing CAFOD staff on the ground, inside one of the partners with a view to: a) provide technical assistance (as CAFOD did for WASH and accountability for CRS), b) support local partners (direct and indirect), c) provide project management support and documentation.

## 6. Annexes

### Annex 1 – CRS-WASH beneficiary survey questionnaire

#### Enquête CAFOD/CRS Bénéficiaires – WASH = EHA (Eau, Hygiène, Assainissement)

Satisfaction: 1=mauvais, 2=pas bon, 3=moyen, 4= bon, 5=très bon. Toujours noter **pourquoi** si note de 1 ou 2.

#### A. General

1. lieu: .....
2. Le répondant: Homme - Femme
3. Combien de temps avez vous passé dans un camp? NON - Lequel? ..... Distance?.....m - ..... Mois
4. CRS faisait l'eau, latrines ou gestion des déchets? O / N – Si oui :.....

#### B. Gouttières-Drum O / N

10. Satisfaction technique: 1 2 3 4 5. Commentaires:.....
11. Satisfaction d'organisation: 1 2 3 4 5. Commentaires:.....
12. Utilité (avantages / inconvénients): .....
13. Problèmes? .....
14. Comment CRS aurait pu faire mieux? .....
15. Accord bénéficiaire: reçu - non-reçu - perdu. **Observé:** O / N. ....

#### C. Latrines CRS Chez moi: O / N -- Partagée: O / N

20. Si oui: neuve - réhabilitée
21. Combien de familles utilisent: 1 2 3 4 >4
22. Satisfaction technique: 1 2 3 4 5. ....
23. Satisfaction d'organisation: 1 2 3 4 5. ....
24. Utilité (avantages / inconvénients): .....
25. Satisfaction du partage: 1 2 3 4 5.
- Commentaires:.....
26. Accord bénéficiaire: reçu - non-reçu - perdu. **Observé:** O / N. ....
27. Problèmes? (individuel / communauté): .....
28. Comment CRS aurait pu faire mieux? .....

#### D. Promotion Hygiène

30. Citez 3 manières de comment vous recevez vous des informations pour la promotion de l'hygiène (indiquer quoi, qui et combien)? .....

33. Quels sont les problèmes d'hygiène? (individuel / communauté): .....

34. Comment CRS aurait pu mieux faire la promotion à l'hygiène?.....

**E. Gestion déchets**

40. Comment gérez vous vos déchets? .....

41. Quelles sont les activités communales (quoi, combien, comment, résultats?): .....

42. Etes vous satisfait de la gestion des déchets: 1 2 3 4 5. ....

43. Quels sont les problèmes de déchets? .....

44. Comment CRS aurait pu faire mieux? .....

**F. Gestion, Participation et Redevabilité (WASH - EHA)**

50. Etes vous satisfait des informations fournies par CRS (quantité, qualité, à temps)? 1 2 3 4 5 .

51. Comment êtes vous informés ? .....

52. Comment avez vous participé aux activités EHA? .....

53. Etes vous satisfait de la sélection des bénéficiaires EHA de CRS? 1 2 3 4 5 . ....

54. Que faites vous si vous avez un problème avec CRS? .....

55. Etes vous satisfait du comportement du staff de CRS? 1 2 3 4 5. ....

56. Quelles sont les activités du Comité Eau et Assainissement:.....

57. Etes vous satisfait de leurs activités et comportement? 1 2 3 4 5 .....

**G. Observations**

Etat gouttière: Bon – moyen - mauvais	Déchets visibles: O / N .....	Lavage main eau: O / N .....
Drum: O / N – Couvercle O / N	Latrine: propre O / N .....	Lavage main savon: O / N .....
Latrine: cadenas O / N	Latrine: couvercle O / N	Filtre à eau .....
Latrine: complète & fonctionnelle O / N - ?.....		

**H. Commentaires** (bénéf / enquêteur): .....

.....

.....

## *Annex 2 – Key Informant Questionnaire*

**Interviewer :**

**Date:**

**Name:**

**Position:**

**Location:**

**A) Combien de temps avez vous travaillé avec CRS/CS/.....:**

**0-3 mois    4-6 mois            7-9 mois    10-12 mois                    13-18 mois            19-24 mois    >2ans**

- 1. Quelles ont été vos activités pour ce projet (détails, chronogramme, décisions):**
  
- 2. Quels ont été les aspects positifs de ce projet?**
  
- 3. Quels ont été les aspects moins bons, à améliorer?**
  
- 4. Quelles ont été les contraintes pour le bon déroulement du projet (internes et externes)?**
  
- 5. Comment ont elles été surmontées (où non, comment/pourquoi)?**
  
- 6. Avec le recul, si le projet était à refaire qu'est ce qui devrait se faire différemment? (leçons apprises)**
  
- 7. Aspects sociaux a) internes et b) externes (participation, information, redevabilité, genre, sélection,)**
  
- 8. Autres commentaires?**



## Annex 3 – A few photos of the context and outputs

### CRS and WASH



A ravine in Solino: a refuse dump which floods every rainy season. A common sight around Port au Prince.



Some of the 400 portable latrines installed at Champ de Mars in February 2010



A double pit latrine installed on a steep slope. Each pit is capped by a hand removable slab to facilitate its emptying.



The inside of a latrine with a concrete seat and a seat cover. Sometimes there are gaps between the cover and the seat, allowing flies to pass through.



Rainwater gutter and downpipe. People usually keep the 30 gallon tank inside to prevent it from being stolen.



A former CRS camp water system supplied by water trucks (now paid for by the beneficiaries themselves).



One of the many unsanitary drainage channels through the camps. CRS paid to have them maintained but they are now unmanaged.



A tightly packed camp with a drainage ditch.



One of the many skips installed by CRS for solid waste disposal.



A block of 8 CRS installed vault public latrines in a camp.

**CaCH-ITECA - Permanent houses**



Rural Gressier, about 1,000 m up on tracks requiring 4X4 even in the dry season.



River beds also serve as 'roads'.



Each house comes with a 1,000 gallon water tank and a VIP latrine.



Prototype of a stone walled house

## ***Annex 4 - Full evaluation TORs***

### **Purpose of the evaluation**

This evaluation should help capture the lessons learned from the implementation of the DEC project in order to help CAFOD and its partner agencies to:

- Enhance accountability to beneficiaries
- Guide future decisions on the humanitarian strategy for Haiti
- Improve response to emergencies in the WASH and Shelter sectors

The evaluation should also fulfil the requirement of accountability to the DEC and to the public that contributed to the DEC Appeal.

### **Intended users of the evaluation**

- CAFOD
- DEC and DEC member agencies
- Partners: CRS, Caritas Switzerland, Trócaire, ITECA, Caritas Australia
- Humanitarian community in Haiti

### **Elements to be evaluated**

The evaluation should assess the following general set of qualities.

**Relevance/appropriateness:** assess whether the response is in line with local needs and priorities. How has working in partnership benefitted the overall programme?

**Connectedness:** assess whether short-term emergency activities are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account (i.e.: coordination, sustainability).

**Coherence:** assess whether there is consistency with relevant policies and in particular whether humanitarian and human rights considerations are taken into account (i.e.: conflict sensitivity, protection, and other CAFOD programmes)

**Coverage:** assess whether the major population groups including the most vulnerable and disadvantaged are reached, providing them with assistance and protection proportionate to their needs.

**Efficiency:** measure the qualitative and quantitative outputs achieved in relation to the inputs and compare alternative approaches to see whether the most efficient approaches were used.

**Effectiveness:** measure the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose or whether this can be expected on the basis of the outputs.

**Impact:** look at the wider effects of the project (social, economic, technical and environmental) on individuals and groups (gender, age groups, communities and institutions) where relevant.

**Gender:** measure the extent to which the programme has addressed issues/concerns specifically relating to gender. Were they appropriate?

More specifically, in line with the DEC evaluation policy and the priorities of the DEC accountability framework, the evaluation should specifically investigate the following:

1. the extent to which proposed objectives and outcomes have been achieved
2. the extent to which the Code of Conduct and Sphere Standards have been respected
3. the level of involvement of and accountability to beneficiaries
4. the extent that past lessons or recommendations have been fulfilled

With reference to the two components of the project, the following specific questions should be answered:

**WASH:** To what extent did the work take into account the needs and concerns of beneficiaries? Were the needs of the most vulnerable addressed? To what extent were beneficiaries involved in the planning and execution of the WASH project? Was input from beneficiaries used to appropriately change/improve the project?

Shelter: Were the implementing partners involved (Caritas Switzerland and ITEKA) able to coordinate effectively with the relevant stakeholders involved in the construction of the housing, including UN cluster, local authorities? How does Caritas Switzerland construction compare to similar projects in the area? How has downward accountability to beneficiaries been managed? To what extent did were beneficiaries involved in the design and planning of the project? Was input from beneficiaries used to appropriately change/improve the project? How has transparency been assured between the implementing partners?

CAFOD Added Value: How did CAFOD's involvement and partnership with CRS and Caritas Switzerland bring added value to the programme overall? Was CAFOD's involvement in the different sectors of the programme relevant, appropriate, and coherent? What could have been managed differently? Was the intervention appropriate in facilitating longer terms interventions or impacts? How does this programme fit within CAFOD's overall approach?

## ***Annex 5 – Evaluation plan/timeline of activities carried out***

<b>Day</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Activity</b>
1	8-Dec	Visit CAFOD HQ in London
2	9-Dec	Visit CAFOD HQ in London
3	10-Dec	fly to US
4	16-Jan	reading and preparation day
5	17-Jan	AM: Flight to PaP. PM: meeting with Laura, security briefing, admin and logistics
6	18-Jan	AM: visit to Nerette. PM: meeting with Nick, Florence KII
7	19-Jan	AM: visit to Solino. PM: meeting with procurement, prepare survey questionnaire
8	20-Jan	Meetings with: M&E, Accountability, E&C, MRD, HR, Finance and Laura
9	21-Jan	Meeting with Daouda (CRS) and Stefan (CaCH)
	22-Jan	Meeting with Josette KII
10	23-Jan	Field day in Camp Acra and Camp Terrain Toto
11	24-Jan	Field day in Nerette
12	25-Jan	Field day in Solino
13	26-Jan	Field day in Gressier (Ti Ginen)
14	27-Jan	Field day in Gressier (Fonma)
15	28-Jan	Notes and report writing
16	30-Jan	Meeting with CaCH, Peter Eppler KII
17	31-Jan	Preparation for presentations
18	1-Feb	Presentation of findings to CRS
19	2-Feb	Presentation of findings to CaCH and ITECA
20	3-Feb	Fly to US
21	6-Feb	report writing
22	7-Feb	report writing
23	8-Feb	report writing
24	9-Feb	report writing
25	10-Feb	report writing – first draft sent to UK
26	12-Feb	Fly to the UK
27	13-Feb	Visit CAFOD HQ in London
27.5	14-Feb	AM only: CAFOD HQ
28	16-Feb	AM only: write and sent second draft
29	19-Feb	fly US
30	23-Feb	Finalise and send final report

## ***Annex 6 – Consultant Bio***

Since April 2010, spent 18 months in Haiti, the first 6 months working for CARE as an M&E advisor to set up a cross sectoral M&E team and then 10 months performing 9 evaluations: two transitional shelter projects evaluations and a housing beneficiary baseline survey for Habitat for Humanity, an ECHO shelter evaluation for CARE (written in French), a country strategy mid-term evaluation for LWF, the final evaluation for the third phase of the SPHERE project for World Vision, an ECHO multisectoral evaluation for the French Red Cross (written in French) and two DEC project evaluations for HelpAge International and for CAFOD.

Independent consultant with 15 years of experience in organisational and technical program management and evaluation in Asia, East & West Africa and Central America with more than 30 years of living and working in 13 different countries. Also recently worked for BRAC in Liberia, Oxfam GB in Eastern Chad, Action Against Hunger in Southern Pakistan and with Catholic Relief Services in Senegal and West Africa.

Completed 29 consultancies for 20 INGOs in the last six years in agriculture/food security, WASH, livelihoods, green energy, infrastructure, etc., providing evaluations, baseline surveys, project design and implementation, strategic planning and review, emergency staff replacement and market and marketing research. Also served as Desk Officer, Program Manager and Country Director for NGOs and as Technical Advisor for a bilateral aid project.

Knowledge and skills for developing country relief and development cover a range of sectors such as: refugee and internally displaced camps; water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); seed system management; food storage and processing; food security; sustainable livelihoods; green/renewable energy; infrastructure (transport, roads and buildings); rural markets; fair trade; markets and marketing; rural microfinance; avian influenza management; locust and caterpillar infestation mitigation; primary and MCH health and HIV/AIDS; cooperatives/associations; micro-enterprises; cash transfers, livelihoods and income generating activities; agriculture extension; community development; soil and water de-salinisation; saline (halophyte) agriculture; transitional shelter; older people's issues.

Fluent in French and English and manages well in Spanish. M.Sc. in Engineering for Rural Development from the University of Cranfield, UK and a B. Eng. in Mechanical/Civil Engineering from the University of Warwick, UK.